There
was a time when in the years following the financial crisis, every
Friday the FDIC would report of one or more small and not small banks
failing, as their liabilities exceeded their assets, who were taken over
by larger peers with a taxpayer subsidy to cover the capital shortfall.
And while this weekly event, also known as "FDIC Failure Friday" has
faded from the US, for now, it has made a grand appearance in China.
China’s financial regulators said on Friday the country’s banking and
insurance regulator and the central bank, will take control of the
small, troubled inner Mongolia-based Baoshang Bank due
to the serious credit risks it poses. The regulator’s control of
Baoshang will last for a year starting on Friday, the People’s Bank of
China (PBOC) and China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission
(CBIRC) said on their websites.
China Construction Bank (CCB) will be entrusted to handle the
business operations of the small lender, based in the industrial city of
Baotou, the statement said.
内モンゴルの小規模貸し手に対しては中国建設銀行が救済する、とその声明に書かれている。
Such a takeover by national authorities is extremely rare, and takes
place amid gathering concerns among regulators and financial analysts
about a renewed surge in bad debts...
... a record pace of corporate defaults,
amounting to 39.2 billion yuan of domestic bond defaults in the first
four months of the year, 3.4 times the total for the same period of
2018...
Moody's analyst Yulia Wan told the WSJ that regulators likely decided
to take over Baoshang to limit any fallout to businesses in Inner
Mongolia. “The move is to reduce the risk of a shock to the local
economy,” said said, adding that the Baoshang takeover appeared
to be the first time that national authorities seized control of a bank
since Chinese lenders started listing on stock markets in the 1990s.
In the past when banks came under pressure, local authorities would
pull together funds from local state-owned firms and investors, or have
another bank stage a takeover.
As Reuters adds, this extremely rare takeover - the
first in nearly three decades - comes at a time when the PBOC has
aggressively eased financial standards and cut reserve ratios for
smaller banks to avoid just this outcome, and highlights the
long struggle of some smaller regional lenders in China, which suffer
from deteriorating asset qualities, inadequate capital buffers, and poor
internal controls and corporate governance
Baoshang Bank rose to prominence after its key stakeholder Tomorrow
Holdings was targeted in a government crackdown on systemic risks posed
by financial conglomerates. The bank was also linked to financier Xiao
Jianhua, according to the WSJ.
Xiao left Hong Kong and crossed the border into mainland China in early
2017, according to statements from Hong Kong police and his company,
and he hasn’t been heard from since.
Later that year, Baoshang "unexpectedly" reported a capital shortage.
この年の遅く、Baoshangは「突然」資金不足を開示した。
Chinese ratings agency Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. then revised its
outlook on Baoshang to negative, questioning the lender’s ability to
repay borrowings. They were right.
中国の格付会社 Dagong Global Credit Rating Coはその時 Baoshanの見通しをネガティブに格下げした、借金返済に際しての貸し手能力に疑念が持たれたのだ。
彼らの判断は正しかった。
Understandably, there is concern the Baosheng takeover "will add to
the vulnerability of country’s financial system amid the economic
slowdown." The reason: if one bank can fail, all can fail. And how long
before depositors jog, run or sprint to their own bank to yank whatever
deposits they have there, in the process beginning the terrifying bank
run domino sequence of events, that eventually collapses China's $40
trillion banking system (by comparison, the US banking system is about
$20 trillion).
While it has been generally described as a "small" bank, Baoshang
had a total of 156.5 billion yuan ($22.68 billion) of outstanding loans
by the end of 2016, a 65% jump from the end of 2014, according
to the bank’s last filing on its assets and liabilities on its website.
What is absolutely bizarre, however, is that the bank's "official" non-performing loan ratio then was only 1.68% as of December 2016. That,
in itself, would never have been sufficient to force a takeover, and
suggests that not only was the bank's real bad debt ratio much higher,
but that China continues to chronically under-represent the true state
of its NPLs to avoid bank runs.
The last time Baoshang disclosed financial data was in the third
quarter of 2017. Then it had 576 billion yuan in assets and 543 billion
yuan in liabilities, with a net profit of 3.2 billion yuan. Based on
those 2017 numbers, analyst Long Chen with consulting firm Gavekal
Dragonomics estimated that Baoshang back then was ranked around the 50th largest bank in the nation. Baoshangが最後に金融データを開示したのは2017Q3だ。このとき資産が576B人民元で、債務は543B人民元だった、またネット利益は3.2B人民元だった。これらの2017年の数値からすると、Gavekal Dragonomicsコンサルティング会社のアナリストLong Chenの見積もりでは、当時Baoshangは50番目に大きな銀行だった。
Naturally, to avoid a panic bank run among other smaller, less
capitalized banks, the CBIRC said that principal and interest on
personal saving accounts in the bank will be fully guaranteed, and the
business operations of Baoshang bank will not be affected by the
takeover.
The takeover of the bank is the first in decades, and takes place
amid China’s crackdown on systemic financial risks, which in February
2018 resulted in the take over of former roll-up giant and conglomerate
Anbang Insurance, which in 2015-2016 made eyebrow-raising investments in
overseas property, including the Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York.
Anbang’s chairman, Wu Xiaohui, was sentenced to 18 years in prison later
that year after being convicted of fraud and abuse of power. Wu
expressed remorse, according to the court that sentenced him, but he
also said he doubted he violated any laws. He hasn’t made a public
statement since.
The question now is whether bank investors, having seen first hand
for the first time in nearly 30 years, that a Chinese bank can fail (and
be taken over by the state), will jog at a leisurely pace, or not so
leisurely, to their own local bank and pull out their deposits in a
cool, calm and collected manner... or not so cool, calm and collected.
If so, the trade with between the US and China will have a clear winner
in the very near future.
Amazonで買物をしてContrarianJを応援しよう Albert Edwards: This Was The Final Recessionary Shoe, And It Has Now Fallen by Tyler Durden Thu, 06/27/2019 - 12:45 Exactly three months ago, in late March, the 3 month-10 year spread inverted for the first time since 2007... ちょうど3か月前の3月遅くのことだ、3M10Yスプレッドが2007年以来初めて反転した・・・・ ... an event which sparked near-panic in the market as historically curve inversion has preceded the last 7 recessions. ・・・市場は準混乱状態になった、というのも歴史的に見てイールドカーブ反転が過去7回の景気後退の前兆となっているからだ。 However, while the inversion was certainly a memorable event, the question on everyone's lips is how do risk assets perform once the curve flattens and/or inverts. According to backtests from Goldman, since the mid-1980s, significant stock drawdowns (i.e. market crashes) began only when term slope started steepening after being inverted. ...
China Injects Gargantuan 1.1 Trillion In Liquidity This Week by Tyler Durden Wed, 01/16/2019 - 22:19 Following what Bloomberg calculated was a record net reverse repo liquidity injection on Wednesday, when the PBOC injected a whopping 560 billion yuan of liquidity into the financial system via open market operations, the Chinese central bank has done it again and in Thursday's open market operation, it sold 250BN yuan in 7 Day repos (slightly below yesterday's record 350BN), and 150BN in 28 Day repos, which net of maturities resulted in a whopping net 380BN yuan ($56.2BN) liquidity injection. ブルームバーグの算出によると水曜に記録的なリバースレポ流動性注入が行われた、PBOCがなんと公開市場操作で金融システムになんと560B人民元を注入した、中国中央銀行は再び木曜に公開市場操作を行った、250B人民元の7日決済レポを売却した(昨日の350B人民元よりも少し少ない)、そして28日決済のレポを150B人民元注入した、結果としてなんと380B人民元($56.2B)の流動性注入となる。 (訳注:なんか足し算すると辻褄が合いません、ブルーム...