Since the post-financial
crisis era began more than a decade ago, record low-interest rates and the
Fed’s acquisition of $4 trillion of the highest quality fixed-income assets has
led investors to scratch and claw for any asset, regardless of quality,
offering returns above the rate of inflation.
Financial media
articles and Wall Street research discussing this dynamic are a dime-a-dozen.
What we have not heard a peep about, however, are the inherent risks within the
corporate bond market that have blossomed due to the way many corporate debt
investors are managed and their somewhat unique strategies, objectives, and legal
guidelines.
This article
offers insight and another justification for moving up in credit within the
corporate bond market. For our prior recommendation to sell junk debt based on
yields, spreads, and the economic cycle, we suggest reading our subscriber-only
article Time To Recycle Your Junk. If
you would like access to that article and many others, you can sign up for RIA Pro and
enjoy all the site has to offer with a 30-day free trial period.
By and large,
equity investors do not have guidelines regulating whether or not they can buy companies
based on the strength or weakness of their balance sheets and income statements.
Corporate bond investors, on the other hand, are typically handcuffed with legal
and/or self-imposed limits based on credit quality. For instance, most bond
funds and ETFs are classified and regulated accordingly by the SEC as
investment grade (rated BBB- or higher) or as high yield (rated BB+ or lower). Most
other institutions, including endowments and pension funds, are limited by
bylaws and other self-imposed mandates. The large majority of corporate bond
investors solely traffic in investment grade, however, there is a contingency
of high-yield investors such as certain mutual funds, ETFs (HYG/JNK), and other
specialty funds.
Often
overlooked, the bifurcation of investor limits and objectives makes an analysis
of the corporate bond market different than that of the equity markets. The
differences can be especially interesting if a large number of securities
traverse the well-defined BBB-/BB+ “Maginot” line, a metaphor for expensive
efforts offering a false line of security.
The U.S. corporate
bond market is approximately $6.4 trillion in size. Of that, over 80% is currently
rated investment grade and 20% is junk-rated.This number does not include bank loans, derivatives, or other
forms of debt on corporate balance sheets.
Since 2000,
the corporate bond market has changed drastically in size and, importantly, in credit
composition. Over this period, the corporate bond market has grown by 378%,
greatly outstripping the 111% growth of GDP.
The bar chart below shows how the credit composition of the corporate
bond market shifted markedly with the surge in debt outstanding.
As circled,
the amount of corporate bonds currently rated BBB represents over 40% of corporate
bonds outstanding, doubling its share since 2000. Every other rating category constitutes
less of a share than it did in 2000. Over that time period, the size of the BBB
rated sector has grown from $294 billion to $2.61 trillion or 787%.
To recap, there
is a large proportion of investment grade investors piled into securities that are
rated BBB and one small step away from being downgraded to junk status. Making
this situation daunting, many investment grade investors are not allowed to
hold junk-rated securities. If only 25% of the BBB-rated bonds were downgraded
to junk, the size of the junk sector would increase by $650 billion or by over
50%. Here are some questions to ponder in the event downgrades on a
considerable scale occur to BBB-rated corporate bonds:
If
a recession causes BBB to BB downgrades, as is typical, will junk investors
retain their current holdings, let alone buy the new debt that has entered
their investment arena?
Will
retail investors that are holding the popular junk ETFs (HYG and JNK) and not
expecting large losses from a fixed income investment, continue to hold these
ETFs?
Will
forced selling from ETF’s, funds, and other investment grade holders result in
a market that essentially temporarily shuts down similar to the sub-prime
market in 2008?
We pose
those questions to help you appreciate the potential for a liquidity issue,
even a bond market crisis, if enough BBB paper is downgraded. If such an event were
to occur, we have no doubt someone would eventually buy the newly rated junk
paper. What concerns us is, at what
price will buyers step up? 私どもはこういう疑念を示し皆さんに潜在的な流動性の問題として捉えてほしい、BBB債権の多くが格下げとなると債券市場でも流動性問題が顕在化する。こういう状況になっても、疑いなくやがて誰かが新規格下げ債権を買うことだろう。ただし、我々の懸念は、どの価格で買い手が現れるかということだ。
Implied Risk 積み上がるリスク
Given that downgrades are a real and present danger and there is real
potential for a massive imbalance between the number of buyers and
sellers of junk debt, we need to consider how close we may be to such an
event. To provide perspective, we present a graph courtesy of Jeff
Gundlach of DoubleLine.
The graph shows
the implied ratings of all BBB companies based solely on the amount of leverage
employed on their respective balance sheets. Bear in mind, the rating agencies
use several metrics and not just leverage. The graph shows that 50% of BBB companies,
based solely on leverage, are at levels typically associated with lower rated
companies.
If 50% of
BBB-rated bonds were to get downgraded, it would entail a shift of $1.30
trillion bonds to junk status. To put
that into perspective, the entire junk market today is less than $1.25 trillion,
and the subprime mortgage market that caused so many problems in 2008 peaked at
$1.30 trillion. Keep in mind, the subprime mortgage crisis and the ensuing
financial crisis was sparked by investor concerns about defaults and resulting
losses.
As mentioned,
if only a quarter or even less of this amount were downgraded we would still
harbor grave concerns for corporate bond prices, as the supply could not easily
be absorbed by traditional buyers of junk.
Investors
should stay ahead of what might be a large event in the corporate bond market.
We recommend corporate bond investors focus on A-rated or solid BBB’s that are less
likely to be downgraded. If investment grade investors are forced to sell, they
will need to find replacement bonds which should help the performance of better
rated corporate paper. What makes this recommendation particularly easy is the
fact that the current yield spread between BBB and A-rated bonds are so tight. The
opportunity cost of being wrong is minimal. At the same time, the benefits of
avoiding major losses are large.
With the current
spread between BBB and A-rated corporate bonds near the tightest level since
the Financial Crisis, the yield “give up” for moving up in credit to A or
AA-rated bonds is a low price to pay given the risks. Simply, the market is begging
you not to be a BBB hero.
Data Courtesy St. Louis Federal
Reserve Summary 要約
The most
important yet often overlooked aspect of investing is properly recognizing and
quantifying the risk and reward of an investment. At times such as today, the
imbalance between risk and reward is daunting, and the risks and/or
opportunities beg for action to be taken.
We believe
investors are being presented with a window to sidestep risk while giving up
little to do so. If a great number of BBB-rated corporate bonds are downgraded,
it is highly likely the prices of junk debt will plummet as supply will
initially dwarf demand. It is in these
types of events, as we saw in the sub-prime mortgage market ten years ago, that
investors who wisely step aside can both protect themselves against losses and
set themselves up to invest in generational value opportunities. 私どもはこう信じている、投資家にとってリスクを回避する余地は十分にある、一方でそれを諦めることはない。もしBBB格付け債権の多くが格下げとなると、ジャンクボンドの価格は急落するだろう、当初供給が需要を圧倒するからだ。こういう出来事を、我々は10年前にサブプライム住宅再建で目の当たりにした、懸命にも回避した投資家は自らの資産を損失から守るだけでなく人生で一度の投資機会を得ることもできる。
While the
topic for another article, a large reason for the increase in corporate debt is
companies’ willingness to increase leverage to buy back stock and pay larger
dividends. Investors desperate for “safer but higher yielding” assets are more
than willing to fund them. Just as the French were guilty of a false confidence
in their Maginot Line to prevent a German invasion, current investors gain
little at great expense by owning BBB-rated corporate bonds.
The
punchline that will be sprung upon these investors is that the increase of debt,
in many cases, was not widely used for productive measures which could have
strengthened future earnings making the debt easier to pay off. Instead, the
debt has weakened a great number of companies.
Michael Lebowitz, CFA is an Investment Analyst and Portfolio Manager for Clarity Financial, LLC. specializing in macroeconomic research, valuations, asset allocation, and risk management. RIA Contributing Editor and Research Director. CFA is an Investment Analyst and Portfolio Manager; Co-founder of 720 Global Research. Follow Michael on Twitter or go to 720global.com for more research and analysis.
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