Last week, one of the most confounding features of the post-Christmas rally was resolved,
when following a 4 month boycott, bearish investors finally threw in
the towel and after pulling money from equity funds for 13 weeks, bought
a whopping $27.3Bn of US stock funds and ETFs in the week ending on
March 13th. This was the second largest inflow on record, behind
$38.30bn from March of last year, and contrasts with a mix of small
inflows and outflows earlier this year, including a $5.83bn outflow in
the prior week.
先週のことだが、クリスマス後のラリーでもっとも混乱してきたことが解決した、4か月ポジションを取っていなかったが、とうとうベア派がタオルを投げて諦めた、市場から13週に渡り資金を引き上げていたが、なんと$27.3Bもの資金を米国株とETFに投じた、3月13日までの一週間の出来事だ。この買いは米国史上二番目のものだ、一番は$38.30Bで昨年3月のものだ、今年の薄商いでの売り買い交錯が今年になって続いていたがこれまでの動きとは大きく異なるものだ、その前の週は$5.83Bの資金流出だった。
The topic of reversing equity flows was also the key focus in the latest note from DB's Parag Thatte, who writes that following
large outflows of over $100bn since October, US equity funds this week
saw inflows surge with over $31bn in the first 3 days, helping drive the S&P 500 back to the top of its recent range.
What to make of this sudden fund flow reversal? As Thatte explains,
there have been only a handful of episodes (9) in the last few years
when US equities saw inflows at such a strong pace. These episodes were
of two types:
In a majority of episodes surging inflows were a contrarian indicator.
6 out of the 9 episodes saw the S&P 500 fall an average of -5.9%
over the course of the following one month, accompanied by outflows.
Exceptions were when inflows were just catching up after lagging the market.
In early- and mid-2013 and in late 2016 following the US elections,
strong equity inflows continued for an extended period of time after the
initial surge, driving the market even higher. These exceptions are
instructive in that they all occurred when inflows were playing catch up
after lagging far behind a market rally, which may be the case now.
However, arguing for the former, less cheerful take on the fund flow
timing reversal is an additional downside risk that has emerged this
week: according to Deutsche, the number of S&P 500 companies
in blackouts will ramp up sharply starting in the last week of March
and peak mid-April, implying a reduced pace of buybacks. As
Thatte warns, "the outsized role played by buybacks in driving the rally
in this recovery cycle as well as investor attention focused on the
blackout period recently adds to the risks highlighted above."
So as companies are about to go cold turkey on what has been another
year of record buybacks, who will be buying - or selling? The answer, as
Thatte explains in laying out the various flows expected from
systematic strategies, is mixed:
The Risk from Vol Control is to the downside. Vol
Control funds were quiet this week. VIX dropped from 16 to 13.5 over
the week as the market rebounded, while 1M realized vol was flat at 9. Vol Control funds are near full equity allocations, so risk is to the downside if volatility spikes.
Vol Controlからのリスクを見ると下落傾向だ。Vol Control ファンドは今週おとなしかった。VIXはこれまでの16から今週13.5に下落した、市場のリバウンドによるものだ、一方で一月のボラティリティは変わらずの9だった。Vol Control ファンドは目一杯株式露出している、そのためもしボラティリティが急上昇すると下落リスクは大きい。
CTAs are poised to buy in the next 7-10 days if a sell-off does not materialize. CTAs
are in aggregate net long S&P 500 and other equity indices, however
with lighter positioning than in 2017-2018. With S&P 500's 50d MA
rising and only -1.7% below the 200d MA, expect more buying if those
technical triggers cross. That is likely to occur within the next 7-10 trading days if a sell-off doesn't materialize. In other words, they will buy unless they sell.
Risk Parity continues to buy equities providing a tailwind. Equity
allocations for Risk Parity are still low relative to their historical
range. Risk Parity managers started buying equities a few weeks ago and
will continue to be incremental buyers in the coming weeks as long as
cross asset volatility continues to decline.
Finally, as the market stormed higher so did hedge fund Gross
Leverage for Equity L/S Hedge Funds, which is now near 12M highs, after
managers slowly added risk YTD. Equity L/S Hedge Funds had a strong
week bringing YTD returns to +6% on average. Top $-longs continue to
outperform top $-shorts, although PMs trimmed net exposure slightly.
One last observation: Emini (S&P futs) liquidity remains abysmal,
with the average ES bid/ask contracts size just above 1,000 and toughly
where it average for much of the fourth quarter. This means that any
abrupt and sustained reversal will likely lead to sharp and violent drop
in the market, as multiple bid levels are taking out in a rerun of what
happened in December.
Amazonで買物をしてContrarianJを応援しよう 記事を紹介しようと訳を入れている間にFOMCが過ぎてしまいタイミングを逸してしまいました、前半は読み飛ばしてください。後半部分に関して、日本では一般会計と特別会計が別れていて政府財政がわかりにくいですが、米国は分離されておらず年金会計がより鮮明になります。$70Tって邦貨でいうと約7000兆円ですからね。 Whistling Past The $70 Trillion Debt Graveyard 07-26-19 Written by Lance Roberts | Jul, 27, 2019 Last week, we discussed the setup for a near-term mean reversion because of the massive extension above the long-term mean. To wit: 先週には、私どもは短期的な平均回帰のし掛けが出来上がっていることを議論した、というのも現在長期的な平均から極端に乖離しているからだ。見てみよう: “There is also just the simple issue that markets are very extended above their long-term trends, as shown in the chart below. A geopolitical event, a shift in expectations, or an acceleration in economic weakness in the U.S. could spark a mean-reverting event which would be quite the norm of what we have seen in recent years.” 「とてもかんたんなことだが、市場は長期的なトレンドからあまりに極端に上方乖離している、それは下のチャートを見れば明らかだ。地政学的出来事、期待値の変化、もしくは米国経済の弱さが加速するなら、平均回帰を引き起こすだろう、それは過去数年でみた典型的な相場の動きだ。」 This analysis is ...
Productivity: What It Is & Why It Matters Written by Michael Lebowitz | Jan, 16, 2019 The Kansas City Federal Reserve posted the Twitter comment and graph below highlighting a very important economic theme. Although productivity is a basic building block of economic analysis, it is one that few economists and even fewer investors seem to appreciate. Kansas 市FEDがツイッターにコメントを投稿した、そのグラフを下に示す、とても重要な経済テーマだ。経済分析においては生産性というのはとても重要な要素だが、ほとんどのエコノミストがこの件に言及しない、投資家は更にこのことを忘れ去っている。 The Kansas City Fed’s tweet is 100% correct in that wages are stagnating in large part due to low productivity growth. As the second chart shows, it is not only wages. The post financial-crisis economic expansion, despite being within months of a record for duration, is by far the weakest since WWII. Kansas City FEDのツイートは100%正しい、給与が停滞している原因の主要因は生産性成長が低いからだ。二番目のチャートを見ても判るように、成長鈍化は給与だけではない。あの金融危機後の経済拡大は、第二次世界大戦後で記録的長期の拡大期間だが、とても弱い拡大だ。 Productivity growth over the last 350+ years is ...
米国はよく理解してませんが、日本の場合では量的緩和で日銀が国債買い上げした資金は日銀当座預金にそのままです、市中には流れていません。でもNHKのニュース等では「ジャブジャブ」という表現をアナウンサーが使い、さらに丁寧に水道の蛇口からお金が吐き出される画像まで示してくれます。これって心理効果が大きいですよね。量的緩和とは何かを7時のニュースや新聞でこれ以上丁寧に解説するのはそう簡単ではありません。一般の人も株式をやっている人も「イメージ」で捉える以上はそう簡単にできません。多くの人は量的緩和とはなにか、を理解していないと私は想像しています。 ただし、国債を買い上げるので長期金利が低下し住宅ローン金利等が下がったのは確実な効果です。一方で長短金利差が少なくなると銀行のビジネスモデルが成り立たなくなりますが。 This Is The One Chart Every Trader Should Have "Taped To Their Screen" by Tyler Durden Sat, 01/19/2019 - 18:55 After a year of tapering, the Fed’s balance sheet finally captured the market’s attention during the last three months of 2018. 一年間のテーパリング後、FEDバランスシートがとうとう市場の注目をあびることになった、2018年の最後の3ヶ月だ。 By the start of the fourth quarter, the Fed had finished raising the caps on monthly roll-off of its balance sheet to the full $50bn per month (peaking at $30bn USTs, $20bn MBS...
このブログ左の参考図書の一つがHoward Marksの本です。初めてこの本を読んだ時、管理人は目からウロコが取れた思いでした。 Howard Marks: "We Had One Of The Most Violent Downdrafts I Had Ever Seen" by Tyler Durden Mon, 01/14/2019 - 09:28 Right around the market peaked on September 2018, Oaktree's iconic founder Howard Marks published a letter to investors in which he warned that the market conditions made it "a time for caution", to wit: 市場がピークを迎えた2018年9月ころ、Oaktreeの伝説的創業者 Howard Marksが投資家向けレターを発行した、この中で市場環境は「注意すべき時だ」と警告した、見てみよう: I’m absolutely not saying people shouldn’t invest today, or shouldn’t invest in debt. Oaktree’s mantra recently has been, and continues to be, “move forward, but with caution.” The outlook is not so bad, and asset prices are not so high, that one should be in cash or near-cash. The penalty in terms of likely opportunity cost is just too great to ...