While
the western world (and much of the eastern) has been preoccupied with
predicting the consequences of Trump's accelerating global trade/tech
war, Beijing has had its hands full with avoiding a bank run in the
aftermath of Baoshang Bank's failure, scrambling to inject massive
amounts of liquidity last week in the form of a 250 billion yuan net
open market operation to thaw the interbank market which was on the
verge of freezing, and sent overnight funding rates spiking and bond
yields and NCD rates higher.
Unfortunately for the PBOC, Beijing is now racing against time to
prevent a widespread panic after it opened the Pandora's box when it
seized Baoshang Bank two weeks ago, the first official bank failure in a
odd replay of what happened with Bear Stearns back in 2008, when
JPMorgan was gifted the historic bank for pennies on the dollar.
PBOCにとって残念なことに、北京政府は今や、２周間前のBaoshang Bank 吸収でパンドラの箱を開いた後の混乱拡大を収束させることで手一杯だ、公式に銀行倒産を認めたことが２００８年のベア・スターンズを思い起こさせる、当時JPMorgaは棚ぼたでこの伝統ある銀行を手中に納めた。
And with domino #1 down, the question turns to who is next, and will they be China's Lehman.
ドミノ＃１に伴い、問題は次に起こることだ、それは中国のレーマン銀行となるだろう。
This was the question we asked last Thursday,
when we published a list of regional banks that have delayed publishing
2018 reports, the biggest red flag suggesting an upcoming bank solvency
"event."
One day later we may have gotten our answer, when the Bank of
Jinzhou, a city commercial bank in Liaoning Province, the second name
in the list above, and with some $105 billion in assets, notably bigger
than Baoshang, announced that its auditors Ernst & Young Hua Ming
LLP and Ernst & Young had resigned, not long after the bank
announced it would delay the publication of its annual reports.
その翌日に我々は答えを得たかもしれない、それはBank of Jinzhou 錦州銀行、遼寧省の商業銀行だ、この表では二番目に書かれている、資産規模は＄１０５B、Baoshangよりもずっと大きい、この銀行の広報によると、監査法人Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP and Ernst & Young が辞退した、当行が年次報告開示遅延を広報してからそう遅くない時期にだ。
For those confused, the delay of an annual report and the resignation of an auditor, means a bank failure is not only virtually certain but practically imminent.
As the bank - which first got in hot water in 2015 over its exposure to the scandal-ridden Hanergy Group -
writes in a filing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, E&Y was first
appointed as the auditors of the Bank at the last annual general meeting
of the Bank held on 29 May 2018 to hold office until the conclusion of
the next annual general meeting of the Bank. That never happened,
because on 31 May 2019, out of the blue, the board and its audit
committee received a letter from EY tendering their resignations as the
auditors of the Bank with immediate effect.
The reason for the resignation: the bank refused to provide E&Y
with documents to confirm the bank's clients were able to service loans,
amid indications that the use of proceeds of certain loans granted by
the Bank to its institutional customers were not consistent with the
purpose stated in their loan documents.
As a result, "after numerous discussions and as at the date of this announcement, no
consensus was reached between the Bank and EY on the Outstanding
Matters and the proposed timetable for the completion of audit." As a result, after a clear breakdown in relations with its own auditor, the
Board decided to appoint Crowe (HK) CPA Limited as the new auditors of
the Bank to fill the casual vacancy following the Resignation and to
hold the office until the conclusion of the 2018 annual general meeting
of the Bank (we are taking the under with lots of leverage as Crowe will
likewise quit in the coming weeks if not days).
And confirming that not even the bank's management believes this
"justification" will be enough to avoid a rout in the stock, the bank
reported that it has requested the trading in the H shares (which was
frozen on April 1) on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited to be
suspended until the publication of the 2018 Annual Results. For anyone
who hopes that these shares will ever be unfrozen for trading, there are
a few bridges in Brooklyn that are for sale.
The real question facing Beijing now is how quickly will Bank of
Jinzhou collapse, how will Beijing and the PBOC react, and what whether
the other banks on the list above now suffer a raging bank run, on which
will certainly not be confined just to China's small and medium banks.
当行取締役はこの出来事を「正当化」することで株価下落を回避するのに十分と考えている一方、香港証券取引所での売買は２０１８年次決算開示までサスペンドとされている（すでに４月１日から売買凍結となっている）。ただし株式売買再開は望み薄だ。現在北京政府が直面している疑念は、 Bank of Jinzhou 倒産までにどれだけの時間があるか、またその時如何に北京政府とPBOCが対応するかだ、そしてこの表の他の銀行も倒産となる銀行等産の嵐がおきるかどうか、どうなるかだ、さらにはそれが中小銀行にとどまるかも懸念される。
この記事よりももっと詳しい分析がこちらにあります。： https://www.adamtownsend.me/china-financial-stability-report/ 元データは毎年開示されるPBOCの英文報告に基づいたものです： http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130736/index.html ただ、毎年２００ページ超もあり、そう簡単に読みこなせるものではありません。この記事の表のようなわかりやすい形で整理して開示はしていません。この記事の表にはどの年の何ページに書かれたデータであるかが示されています。日本語ネットの記事ではシャードーバンクの規模がよくわからないというものが多いですが、毎年PBOC自らがシャドーバンク規模を自ら認めています。その規模は驚くものです。 この記事に書かれている数値は驚くばかりです。ここまで信用創造をしているのかと驚きます。そりゃ昨年来RRRの低減とかの緩和策を連発してますが、効果が無いのももっともです。これまでの緩和の規模からすると昨年のこの手の緩和はその規模が全く足りないですね。一年以上前にZeroHedgeで中国企業の殆どがミンスキーポイントを超えている、企業の営業利益で債務金利が賄えず利払いのために新たな借金をしている、というのが詳しくデータで示されていましたが、なるほどなと思います。 The Black Swan So Ugly No One Will Talk About It by Phoenix Capita… Fri, 01/11/2019 - 11:55 The biggest black swan facing the financial system is China. 金融システムが直面する最大のブラックスワンは中国だ。 China has been the primary driver of growth for the global economy since the 2008 Crisis...
米国はよく理解してませんが、日本の場合では量的緩和で日銀が国債買い上げした資金は日銀当座預金にそのままです、市中には流れていません。でもNHKのニュース等では「ジャブジャブ」という表現をアナウンサーが使い、さらに丁寧に水道の蛇口からお金が吐き出される画像まで示してくれます。これって心理効果が大きいですよね。量的緩和とは何かを７時のニュースや新聞でこれ以上丁寧に解説するのはそう簡単ではありません。一般の人も株式をやっている人も「イメージ」で捉える以上はそう簡単にできません。多くの人は量的緩和とはなにか、を理解していないと私は想像しています。 ただし、国債を買い上げるので長期金利が低下し住宅ローン金利等が下がったのは確実な効果です。一方で長短金利差が少なくなると銀行のビジネスモデルが成り立たなくなりますが。 This Is The One Chart Every Trader Should Have "Taped To Their Screen" by Tyler Durden Sat, 01/19/2019 - 18:55 After a year of tapering, the Fed’s balance sheet finally captured the market’s attention during the last three months of 2018. 一年間のテーパリング後、FEDバランスシートがとうとう市場の注目をあびることになった、２０１８年の最後の３ヶ月だ。 By the start of the fourth quarter, the Fed had finished raising the caps on monthly roll-off of its balance sheet to the full $50bn per month (peaking at $30bn USTs, $20bn MBS...
