There
was a time when in the years following the financial crisis, every
Friday the FDIC would report of one or more small and not small banks
failing, as their liabilities exceeded their assets, who were taken over
by larger peers with a taxpayer subsidy to cover the capital shortfall.
And while this weekly event, also known as "FDIC Failure Friday" has
faded from the US, for now, it has made a grand appearance in China.
China’s financial regulators said on Friday the country’s banking and
insurance regulator and the central bank, will take control of the
small, troubled inner Mongolia-based Baoshang Bank due
to the serious credit risks it poses. The regulator’s control of
Baoshang will last for a year starting on Friday, the People’s Bank of
China (PBOC) and China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission
(CBIRC) said on their websites.
China Construction Bank (CCB) will be entrusted to handle the
business operations of the small lender, based in the industrial city of
Baotou, the statement said.
内モンゴルの小規模貸し手に対しては中国建設銀行が救済する、とその声明に書かれている。
Such a takeover by national authorities is extremely rare, and takes
place amid gathering concerns among regulators and financial analysts
about a renewed surge in bad debts...
... a record pace of corporate defaults,
amounting to 39.2 billion yuan of domestic bond defaults in the first
four months of the year, 3.4 times the total for the same period of
2018...
Moody's analyst Yulia Wan told the WSJ that regulators likely decided
to take over Baoshang to limit any fallout to businesses in Inner
Mongolia. “The move is to reduce the risk of a shock to the local
economy,” said said, adding that the Baoshang takeover appeared
to be the first time that national authorities seized control of a bank
since Chinese lenders started listing on stock markets in the 1990s.
In the past when banks came under pressure, local authorities would
pull together funds from local state-owned firms and investors, or have
another bank stage a takeover.
As Reuters adds, this extremely rare takeover - the
first in nearly three decades - comes at a time when the PBOC has
aggressively eased financial standards and cut reserve ratios for
smaller banks to avoid just this outcome, and highlights the
long struggle of some smaller regional lenders in China, which suffer
from deteriorating asset qualities, inadequate capital buffers, and poor
internal controls and corporate governance
Baoshang Bank rose to prominence after its key stakeholder Tomorrow
Holdings was targeted in a government crackdown on systemic risks posed
by financial conglomerates. The bank was also linked to financier Xiao
Jianhua, according to the WSJ.
Xiao left Hong Kong and crossed the border into mainland China in early
2017, according to statements from Hong Kong police and his company,
and he hasn’t been heard from since.
Later that year, Baoshang "unexpectedly" reported a capital shortage.
この年の遅く、Baoshangは「突然」資金不足を開示した。
Chinese ratings agency Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. then revised its
outlook on Baoshang to negative, questioning the lender’s ability to
repay borrowings. They were right.
中国の格付会社 Dagong Global Credit Rating Coはその時 Baoshanの見通しをネガティブに格下げした、借金返済に際しての貸し手能力に疑念が持たれたのだ。
彼らの判断は正しかった。
Understandably, there is concern the Baosheng takeover "will add to
the vulnerability of country’s financial system amid the economic
slowdown." The reason: if one bank can fail, all can fail. And how long
before depositors jog, run or sprint to their own bank to yank whatever
deposits they have there, in the process beginning the terrifying bank
run domino sequence of events, that eventually collapses China's $40
trillion banking system (by comparison, the US banking system is about
$20 trillion).
While it has been generally described as a "small" bank, Baoshang
had a total of 156.5 billion yuan ($22.68 billion) of outstanding loans
by the end of 2016, a 65% jump from the end of 2014, according
to the bank’s last filing on its assets and liabilities on its website.
What is absolutely bizarre, however, is that the bank's "official" non-performing loan ratio then was only 1.68% as of December 2016. That,
in itself, would never have been sufficient to force a takeover, and
suggests that not only was the bank's real bad debt ratio much higher,
but that China continues to chronically under-represent the true state
of its NPLs to avoid bank runs.
The last time Baoshang disclosed financial data was in the third
quarter of 2017. Then it had 576 billion yuan in assets and 543 billion
yuan in liabilities, with a net profit of 3.2 billion yuan. Based on
those 2017 numbers, analyst Long Chen with consulting firm Gavekal
Dragonomics estimated that Baoshang back then was ranked around the 50th largest bank in the nation. Baoshangが最後に金融データを開示したのは2017Q3だ。このとき資産が576B人民元で、債務は543B人民元だった、またネット利益は3.2B人民元だった。これらの2017年の数値からすると、Gavekal Dragonomicsコンサルティング会社のアナリストLong Chenの見積もりでは、当時Baoshangは50番目に大きな銀行だった。
Naturally, to avoid a panic bank run among other smaller, less
capitalized banks, the CBIRC said that principal and interest on
personal saving accounts in the bank will be fully guaranteed, and the
business operations of Baoshang bank will not be affected by the
takeover.
The takeover of the bank is the first in decades, and takes place
amid China’s crackdown on systemic financial risks, which in February
2018 resulted in the take over of former roll-up giant and conglomerate
Anbang Insurance, which in 2015-2016 made eyebrow-raising investments in
overseas property, including the Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York.
Anbang’s chairman, Wu Xiaohui, was sentenced to 18 years in prison later
that year after being convicted of fraud and abuse of power. Wu
expressed remorse, according to the court that sentenced him, but he
also said he doubted he violated any laws. He hasn’t made a public
statement since.
The question now is whether bank investors, having seen first hand
for the first time in nearly 30 years, that a Chinese bank can fail (and
be taken over by the state), will jog at a leisurely pace, or not so
leisurely, to their own local bank and pull out their deposits in a
cool, calm and collected manner... or not so cool, calm and collected.
If so, the trade with between the US and China will have a clear winner
in the very near future.
現在のCPI推移をみるとFEDの言う2%目標に収まりそうにはありません。実際現在の金利政策はまだ緩和的で、政府の大判振る舞いもあり、M2はコロナ騒動以前のトレンドを大きく超えたまま漸増し始めています。大統領選挙もあり、パウエルは今後利上げはないと言明しており、利下げ期待が高まっています。 In Gold We Trust 2024(20ページ目)では1970年代のインフレ推移と現在2024年のインフレ推移を重ね、もっと大きなインフレがこれから来そうだと示唆しています。 https://ingoldwetrust.report/in-gold-we-trust-report/?lang=en 当時は数年間でゴールド価格は7倍になりました。直近のCPIのピーク値と比べると、今回は次のピーク、今後数年、でゴールドが5倍程度になることが期待されます。 ミシガン大学の調査ではインフレがFED目標の2%に落ち着くと期待されず、最近では期待値が増え始めています。
Global Warming Fraud Exposed In Pictures by Tyler Durden Tue, 10/01/2019 - 12:25 Authored by Mike Shedlock via MishTalk, Climate change alarmists have convinced the public something must be done now. The reports are easily debunked as fraud ... 気候変動主張者たちは今行動を実行せねばと確信している。その手の報告書はでたらめだということが簡単に解る・・・・ My Gift To Climate Alarmists 気候変動活動家への贈り物 Tony Heller does an amazing job of showing how the fraud takes place in his video entitled My Gift To Climate Alarmists. Tony Heller は素晴らしい仕事をした、このビデオを見ると彼らの主張が如何にでたらめかということがよく分かる、そのタイトルは My Gift To Climate Alarmists。 The video is only 12.51 minutes long. このビデオはわずか12.51分しかない。(訳注:画像・動画がいっぱいで英語がわからなくても理解できる) Cherry Picking 例を上げると Heatwaves increasing since 1960 熱波発生は1960年以降増えているという Arctic ice declining since 1979 北極海氷は1979年以来減っているという Wildfires increa...