For
those who have grown bored with the ongoing US-China trade war whose
escalation was obvious to all but the dumbest BTFD algos, the biggest
news of the past week was that yet another Chinese bank was bailed out by the Chinese
government - the third in the past three months - and a substantial one
at that: with over 1.4 trillion yuan in assets ($200BN), Hang Feng
Bank's nationalization was certainly large enough to make a dent on the
Chinese financial system and on the Chinese Sovereign Wealth Fund, which
drew the short straw and was told to bailout the troubled Chinese bank (more here).
Hang Feng's bailout followed those of Baoshang and Bank of Jinzhou, which means that 3 of the top 4 most troubled banks have now been either nationalized by an SOE or seized by the government, which is effectively the same thing.
Hang Feng救済はBaoshang とBank of Jinzhouに続くものであり、4大問題銀行の内3行がすでに国有化され、国有企業化政府に吸収された、どれも似たようなものだ。
Of course, to regular readers this development was hardly surprising,
especially after our post in mid-July when we saw the $40 trillion
Chinese banking system approach its closest encounter with the
proverbial "Lehman moment" yet, when inexplicably the four-day repo rate
on China’s government bonds (i.e., the cost for investors to pledge
their Chinese government bond holdings for short-term funding) on the
Shanghai exchange briefly spiked to 1,000% in afternoon trading.
While some attributed the surge to a fat finger, far more ominous
signs were already present, and in the aftermath of the Baoshang
failure, which has sent Chinese banking stocks tumbling, one-day and
seven-day weighted average borrowing rates had remained low thanks to
huge central bank cash injections - such as the 250BN yuan we described back in May - longer tenors such as the 1 month repo have marched sharply higher.
And now, none other than Goldman points out that something is clearly
breaking inside China's banking system as one after another small bank
domino falls, and as following the Baoshang Bank takeover in late May,
interbank lenders have become more cautious towards the credit risk of
smaller and weaker financial institutions.
今や他でも無いゴールドマンがこう指摘する、中国銀行システム内部で明らかに何かが壊れている、小型銀行が次々と倒産するドミノが起きている、5月遅くにBaoshang Bank を接収した後、銀行間貸し手は更に注意深くなり、弱小金融機関の与信リスクを懸念している。
The result: a Chinese banking system in which banks have lost trust
in one another, manifested itself in much tighter liquidity in the
interbank market, with the highest intraday 7-day repo rates
staying above 8% over the past month as questions swirl over the
viability of the underlying collateral. In fact, as shown in
the chart below, the creeping funding freeze among Chinese banks is now
even worse compared to the historic episode in the summer of 2013 when
following an aggressive ramp up in Beijing's deleveraging campaign, repo
rates exploded to the point that banks effectively stopped interacting
with each other.
As Goldman observes, "the sustained spikes in intraday repo rates
suggest that some banks are still under pressure and are having to pay
higher costs to obtain funding in the interbank market. A number of
action has been taken to ease concerns regarding credit risk at smaller
banks, including the recent equity injection into Bank of Jinzhou by
ICBC Financial Asset Investment Company and China Cinda Asset
Management."
ゴールドマンの見立てでは、「日中のレポレートスパイクが常態化し、これはいくつかの銀行がまだ圧力下にあり、高い金利を負担してもインターバンク市場で資金調達せざるを得ない状況にあることを示している。小型銀行の与信リスク懸念を緩和するいくつかの措置が取られている、たとえば最近のICBC Financial Asset InvestmentCompanyとChina Cinda Asset ManagementからBank of Jinzhouへの資本注入だ。」
Nonetheless, as the bank concludes, "it will take more time before
market conditions will normalize." Meanwhile, if more banks from the
list above, or worse, larger banks, end up failing - and so far there is
every indication that the process is only getting worse - the Chinese
funding freeze could get so large that the most dreaded event finally
take place: a bank run among one of China's largest, state-owned banks,
which as a reminder, are also the largest in the world.
One final, if key, point: it's not just Chinese banks that are in
funding peril, Chinese corporations are are on the firing line, and as
Goldman points out in the same report, the pace of China onshore bond
defaults is showing no signs of slowing down. According to the bank's
estimates there were five new defaults in July, bringing the total
number of new defaults this year to 23 (Exhibit 1), compared with 38 new
defaults that occurred in 2018. These 23 issuers had RMB 90.5bn of
onshore bonds outstanding at the time of default, equating to 0.5% of all onshore corporate bonds outstanding at the start of 2019. However,
all the defaults so far this year are from privately owned enterprises
(POEs), and the RMB 90.5bn of onshore bonds outstanding at the time of
default equates to 3.5% of all POE bonds outstanding at the start of
this year. To us, the elevated level of defaults continue to impact
weaker credit, as the net issuance of bonds rated AA or lower turned
negative in July.
For those curious, below is a comprehensive, if not complete, list of
Chinese corporations that have defaulted since 2014, when China first
started permitting corporations to fail (smaller companies have been
omitted).
多量のオピオイドを米国に送り込み、米国で深刻な麻薬中毒問題を引き起こしています。現代版「阿片戦争」です。あのトヨタ初の女性取締役もオピオイド中毒で逮捕解任されましたよね。 US Is Dependent On China For Almost 80% Of Its Medicine by Tyler Durden Fri, 05/31/2019 - 12:55 Experts are warning that the U.S. has become way too reliant on China for all our medicine , our pain killers, antibiotics, vitamins, aspirin and many cancer treatment medicine. 専門家はこう警告する、米国はすべての医薬品、痛み止め、抗生物質、ビタミン、アスピリン、各種抗がん剤で、中国依存度が高すぎる。 Fox Business reports that according to FDA estimates at least 80 percent of active ingredients found in all of America’s medicine come from abroad, primarily from China . And it’s not just the ingredients, China wants to become the world’s dominant generic drug maker. So far Chinese companies are making generic for everything from high blood pressure to chemotherapy drugs. 90 percent of America’s prescriptions a...
日本と同じくPOMOになる公算が大きいとは思いますが、どうでしょうね。 米国大統領選挙の勝者と11月投票日前数ヶ月の株価の動向には9割以上の相関があります。はっきり言えば、公約とか主義主張には無関係です :) 。この時期株価を維持・上昇すると現職政党勝利、株価が下落すると挑戦政党勝利となります。熱心な民主党員活動家である前FED議長イエレンは頻繁に口先介入をしましたが、量的緩和再開まで踏み込めず、4年前の秋に株価が下落し、トランプ勝利となりました。株価と大統領選挙の相関をトランプは熟知しています、4年前には株価が下落するようしきりと口先介入していました。今年は11月まで株価を維持できるかどうか?どうでしょう。 Mark Your Calendar: Next Week The Fed's Liquidity Drain Begins by Tyler Durden Fri, 01/03/2020 - 14:54 What goes up, must come down, at least in theory. 上昇があれば、その後に下落が伴う、少なくとも理論上ではそうだ。 Ever since the start of October when the Fed launched QE4 - or as some still call it "Not QE" - in response to the Sept repo crisis, figuring out the market has been pretty simple: if the Fed's balance sheet goes up so does the S&P500, and vice versa. 10月にFEDがQE4を始めて以来ーー「Not QE」という人もいるがーー9月のレポ危機に対応したものだが、相場はとても単純になった:FEDがバランス...
先週の記事です。最後の2段落だけ訳をいれておきます。 Gold’s Peculiar Surge Adam Hamilton February 21, 2020 3246 Words Gold is enjoying an awesome week, surging back above $1600 for the first time in nearly 7 years! That big round psychologically-heavy level is really catching traders’ attention, great improving sentiment. Yet this recent gold surge has proven peculiar. Unlike normal rallies, the buying driving this one largely hasn’t come from gold’s usual primary drivers. The stealth buying behind this surge may impair its staying power. This Tuesday gold surged 1.2% higher to close near $1602. It hadn’t crested $1600 on close since way back in late March 2013 fully 6.9 years ago! Long-time gold traders shudder at the dark spring which followed. Within less than several weeks after that last $1600+ close, gold plummeted 16.2%. Most of that came in ...
What Could Go Wrong? The Fed's Warns On Corporate Debt by Tyler Durden Thu, 05/09/2019 - 11:44 Authored by Lance Roberts via RealInvestmentAdvice.com, “So, if the housing market isn’t going to affect the economy, and low interest rates are now a permanent fixture in our society, and there is NO risk in doing anything because we can financially engineer our way out it – then why are all these companies building up departments betting on what could be the biggest crash the world has ever seen? What is more evident is what isn’t being said. Banks aren’t saying “we are gearing up just in case something bad happens.” Quite the contrary – they are gearing up for WHEN it happens. When the turn does come, it will be unlike anything we have ever seen before. The scale of it could be considerable because of the size of some...