FEDの「金融工学」もその限界に達した

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The Limits Of The Fed's "Financial Engineering" Have Been Reached

by Tyler Durden

Thu, 06/06/2019 - 15:35

Submitted by Joseph Carson, Former Chief Economist, AllianceBernstein,

Decisions to change official rates can no longer be made exclusively on economic growth and price considerations as the dynamics of business cycles have changed. The new business cycle consists of growth and financial leverage (debt), replacing the old cycle of growth and price leverage.

もはや、公式金利変更が経済成長や物価に圧倒的影響を与えることはない、ビジネスサイクルの力学が昔とは違うのだ。新たなビジネスサイクルは成長と金融レバレッジ（債務）で生み出される、昔はビジネスサイクルは成長とprice leverage（株価レバレッジ？）によるものだった。



As such, decisions to provide more monetary accommodations to sustain growth or lift inflation to the preferred target has to be weighed against growing financial vulnerabilities associated with the sharp rise in private sector debt. Promises by policymakers to provide additional monetary accommodation to sustain the growth cycle is more likely to do more long-term harm than good as it will only increase the scale of financial vulnerabilities.

In recent decades, monetary policy through its adjustments and control of short-term interest rates has had more influence on financial transactions than economic ones as individuals and nonfinancial corporations have engaged in active management of the liability side of their balance sheet, taking on record amounts of debt at relatively low rates, elevating real and financial asset prices in the process, while providing only modest benefits to overall economy.


こういう状況なので、持続的成長やインフレ維持のためのさらなる金融緩和判断が重要性を増し、民間部門債務急増による金融脆弱性が増加する。政策立案者はさらなる金融緩和で成長持続を約束するが、それがより長期間害するだけでなく金融脆弱性の規模を増やすだけだ。ここ何十年かを見ると、短期金利調整という金融政策は実体経済よりも金融取引への影響が大きく、個人や非金融企業はバランスシートの債務部門に積極的関与せざるをえず、低金利のために記録的な額の債務を抱えることになった、これが不動産や金融資産を上昇させた、一方で経済システム全体への恩恵はそれほどでもない。

For example, since 2011 nonfinancial corporations have added to $5.2 trillion in debt to their balance sheets. Corporations used this debt for a variety of purposes, such as acquiring other companies, purchasing real estate, buying back their own stock, while also investing in plant and equipment to run their regular business operations. Yet, the incremental growth in nonresidential investment has been a little more than $1 trillion. In other words, for every $5 borrowed by nonfinancial corporations only $1 has found itself redeployed in the real economy.

例えば、２０１１年以来、非金融企業はバランスシートの債務を＄５．２T増やした。企業はこの債務を各種目的に利用した、例えば企業買収、不動産買取、自社株買いなどだ、一方通常業務のための設備投資などにも投資はしている。しかし、非住宅への投資増加は＄１Tほどでしかない。言い換えると、非金融企業は＄５を借金して実経済への投資はわずか＄１でしかない。

In the 2000s cycle, households also went on a borrowing binge, adding over $7 trillion in new debt over the span of seven years. Most of the new debt was invested in real estate. Over the course of the 2000's growth cycle households added $2 of debt for every $1 increase in consumer spending and investment in housing. Much higher ratios of debt to new investment occurred during the dot.com boom of the late 1990s and the the commercial real estate boom of the late 1980s.

２０００年代の景気サイクルでは、家計の借金が花盛りだっった、７年の間に＄７Tも新規借金を増やした。新規借金の多くは不動産に投じられた。２０００年代の成長期には家計は＄２借金をして消費に＄１を投じ、そして住宅に＄１投資した。１９９０年台後半のドットコムバブルにおいてはもっと債務比率が高かった、また１９８０年台後半の商業不動産ブームのときにもそうだった。

All of these episodes highlight the new linkages and tradeoffs between monetary policy and financial activities. Yet, the failure to adapt, and even recognize, the changing linkages caused policymakers to miss, or downplay, the buildup of financial vulnerabilities in the system and the adverse shocks to the economy and the financial system were repeated time and again.

この出来事はどれも金融政策と金融活動の新たな関連を示してる。しかし適応不良と認識不足で、これらの相関変化が政策立案者に間違いを引き起こさせた、もしくは見くびっていた、システムの金融脆弱性が積み上がり、経済や金融システムへの不都合なショックを与え、これが何度も繰り返された、今回もまたもやだ。


Each period of excessive credit and financial leverage was followed by a long bout of debt-deleveraging forcing the Fed to engage in a "financial engineering" campaign to cushion the economy and bring stability to the financial system. Following the commercial real estate crash of the early 1990s the Federal Reserve lowered official rates 650 basis points; 550 basis points following the dot-com bubble; and 500 basis points (and probably an extra 200 basis points of easing occurred with the Fed’s asset purchase program) after the housing bubble.

過剰与信や過剰金融レバレッジを敷き起こすとその後には長期の債務解消となりFEDは「金融工学」を実行せざるを得なくなる、経済への影響を和らげ、金融システム安定化を得るためだ。１９９０年代の商業不動産暴落の後には、FEDはFFRを６５０BPSも下げ；ドットコムバブルの後には５５０BPSも下げた；そして住宅バブルの後には５００BPSも下げた（さらにFEDの資産買取で実効的にさらに２００BPS低下と同等の効果を生み出した）。

Today, even though the current environment has similar characteristics---large increases in debt and elevated asset prices--that preceded each of the past three recessions policymakers do not seem to be concerned about the growing buildup of financial vulnerabilities. Yet, the financial markets with Treasury yields out to 10 years trading well below the target on the federal funds rate suggests that the limits of the Fed's "financial engineering" have been reached and additional monetary accommodation will have a negative trade-off between costs and benefits.

今日では、現在の環境はそれらとよく似たものだがーー債務が大きく増え資産価格が大きく上昇しているーー過去三回の景気後退前に政策立案者は積み上がる金融システム脆弱性を懸念していなかったように見える。ただ、金融市場を見ると、１０年債金利はすでにFFRよりも低くなっており、FEDの「金融工学」も限界に達し、さらなる金融緩和策はコスト・ベネフィットを考えるとマイナストレードオフとなるだろう。


In fact, it would not be a surprise if market yields stay near current levels even if the Fed decides to lower official rates since encouraging more debt growth would only tip the scale more so to a bad outcome down the road.


実際、たとえFEDがFFRを下げたところで市場金利が今のままでも驚きはしない、というのもさらなる債務増加を促したところで、状況を悪化させやがて悪い結末を迎える。