Something is seriously starting to break in China's financial system.
中国金融システムに深刻な変調が起き始めている。
Three days after we described the self-destructive doom loop that is tearing apart China's smaller banks, where a second bank run took place in just two weeks -
an unprecedented event for a country where until earlier this year not a
single bank was allowed to fail publicly and has now had no less than five bank high
profile nationalizations/bailouts/runs so far this year - the Chinese
bond market is bracing itself for an unprecedented shock: a
major, Fortune 500 Chinese commodity trader is poised to become the
biggest and highest profile state-owned enterprise to default in the
dollar bond market in over two decades. 中国の小規模銀行の「自滅ループ」に関する記事をZeroHedgeが公開してからわずか３日しかたたないが、ーーわずか２週で二回目の取り付け騒ぎがあったというものーー年初までは一行たりとも公式な倒産は許されなかったのだが、いまやすでに５行が国有化／救済／取り付けとなっているーー中国債券市場は前代未聞のショックに身構えている：フォーチュン５００に載るような大手コモディティ商社（国有企業）が２０年ぶりのドル建て債権デフォルトになりそうだ。
In what Bloomberg dubbed the
latest sign that Beijing is more willing to allow failures in the
politically sensitive SOE sector - either that, or China is simply no
longer able to control the spillovers from its cracking $40 trillion
financial system - commodity trader Tewoo Group -
the largest state-owned enterprise in China's Tianjin province - has
offered an "unprecedented" debt restructuring plan that entails deep
losses for investors or a swap for new bonds with significantly lower
returns.
Tewoo Group is a SOE conglomerate, owned by the local government and
operates in a number of industries including infrastructure, logistics,
mining, autos and ports, according to its website. It also operates in
multiples countries including the U.S., Germany, Japan and Singapore. The company ranked 132 in 2018’s Fortune Global 500 list, higher than many other Chinese conglomerates including
service carrier China Telecommunications and financial titan Citic
Group. Even more notable are the company's financials: it had an annual
revenue of $66.6 billion, profits of about $122 million, assets worth
$38.3 billion, and more than 17,000 employees as of 2017, according to
Fortune’s website.
The state-owned company is neither publicly listed nor rated by the
top three international ratings companies, although it does have
publicly traded bonds whose performance in recent months has been
nothing short of terrifying for anyone who thought purchasing a company
explicitly backed by Beijing can never fail.
As one can deduce from the above chart, the first time Tewoo Group’s financial difficulties emerged was
in April when it sought debt extension from its lenders on its
offshore, dollar bonds and sold copper below market rates amid a cash
crunch. At that time, Fitch Ratings - the only rating agency to
appraise the company's credit standing - slashed the company’s credit
score first from BBB to BBB- on April 18, and then by a whopping six notches, from BBB - to B- on April 29, to reflect its weak liquidity and higher-than-expected leverage.
According to Bloomberg the company has proposed an exchange/tender
offer on the three dollar bonds due to mature over the next three years,
as well as a perpetual note. What makes what would otherwise be a
mundane exchange offer in the US, is that this is the first ever distressed plan of its kind from a state-owned Chinese firm. ブルームバーグの報道によると、当社は今後３年で満期になるドル建て債権３本の交換を申し出た、永久債とするというものだ。米国ではよくあることだが、中国の国有企業がこういうふうになるのは初めてでよほどのことだ。
What is just as striking is that the Tewoo Group - with its $66
billion in revenues and $38 billion in assets - is likely to default on
its $300 million dollar bond due Dec. 16, a Bloomberg source said,
unless the exchange is consummated. This means that the company's
bondholders have just a few weeks to decide between either taking as
much as 64% in losses or accepting delayed repayment with sharply
reduced coupons on $1.25 billion of dollar bonds, something which the
rating agencies will describe as an event of default. いまTewoo Groupが直面しているのはーー＄６６Bの売上で＄３８Bの資産を持つにも関わらずーー１２月１６日満期の＄３００M債権がデフォルトになりそうだということだ、とブルームバーグ情報源は言う、債権交換が実現しなかった場合だ。当社の債権保持者に残された時間はわずか３週間しか無い、６４％の損失を受け入れるか、ドル建て＄１．２５Bに大幅減額となったクーポンで返済遅れを受け入れるか、どちらかだ、格付会社はこの状況を倒産と認識するだろう。
A de facto default by Tewoo would be considered a
“landmark case,” said Cindy Huang, an analyst at S&P Global
Ratings. Central government support for SOEs is likely to be selective
in the future, while local government aid will be limited by the slowing
economy and weaker fiscal position, she said.
もはやTewooは倒産状態でこれは「中国のランドマーク現象だ」とCindy Huangは言う、彼女はS＆P Global Ratingsのアナリストだ。今後も中央政府が救済する国有企業は選択されるだろう、地方政府の救済力には限界がある、経済鈍化で財政難となっている、と彼女は言う。
The "distressed exchange offer" comes after Tewoo Group said last
week it would be unable to pay interest on a $500 million bond,
prompting Industrial & Commercial Bank of China to transfer $7.875
million to bondholders on its behalf. ICBC provided a standby letter of
credit on the note - a pledge to repay if the borrower can’t. However,
the firm’s remaining $1.6 billion of dollar bonds lack such protection.
先週のTewoo Groupの「絶望的な交換申し出」の後に＄５００M債権の利払いも出来ないだろう、債権保持者に＄７．８７５Bを送金するICBC中国工商銀行が督促している。ICBCは standby letter を提供しているーー債権者が返済できないときには代理返済を約束するというものだ。しかしながら、Tewoo Groupnihaには＄１．６Bのドル建て国債しか残っていない、返済には不足する。
Worse, Tewoo Group is already in effective default after some of its
units previously missed local debt payments - in July, Tianjin Hopetone
missed a coupon payment on its 1.21 billion yuan note sending the
company's dollar bonds tumbling below 50 cents on the dollar, while
Tianjin Haoying Industry & Trade missed a loan interest payment due
in June. Also in July, rating agency Fitch - which somehow missed all of
this when it was rating the company investment grade - withdrew its
rating on Tewoo Group due to insufficient information to maintain the
ratings. It last rated the issuer at B-.
悪いことに、Tewoo Groupはすでにその内部ユニットがすでに地方債務返済が出来ず実行的に倒産状態にあるーー７月に、Tianjin Hopetoneが１．２１B人民元のクーポン支払いが出来なかった、このためこの会社のドル建て債権が半額以下になった、一方で、Tianjin Haoying Industry &Tradeは６月の債権利払いが出来なかった、格付け会社Fitchによるとーこれを見て投資格付けを大幅に引き下げたーー格付けのための十分な資料をTewoo Groupが提供しないために格付けを断った。そのためB-が続いている。
And as furious bondholders scramble to demand an explanation how a
state-owned enterprise can default, Beijing is already bracing for the
inevitable next steps: earlier this month, Tianjin State-owned Capital
Investment and Management, an entity wholly-owned by the Tianjin
municipal government, was appointed to manage the company’s offshore
debt. For now, the entity has no plan to hold controlling stakes in
Tewoo Group, although that will likely change as soon as the company's
financial situation fails to improve. Meanwhile, Tewoo Group said it
plans to take a series of debt management measures, by which we assume
it means it will restructure its debt.
そして怒り狂った債権保持者は問い詰めた、国有企業が倒産することなどあるのか説明しろと、北京政府はすでに回避不能な次の段階に身構えている：今月始めのことだ、Tianjin State-owned Capital Investment and Management、１００％天津省保有の組織だが、この組織が返済不能となった海外債務を処理するように指名した。今の所、この組織にTewoo Groupを指導する計画はまったくない、早急にTewoo Groupの財政問題改善が求めラルにも関わらずだ。それと同時に、Tewoo Groupが言うには、一連の債務問題への対処作を持っているという、それは債務再編であるとZeroHedgeは見ている。
The fact that a state owned enterprise such as Tewoo has just days before it defaults, in either a prepack or "freefall" form, suggests that Beijing will no longer bail out troubled SOEs, let alone private firms,
perhaps due to the strains imposed by the economy which is slowing the
most in three decades. It also raises concerns over Tianjin, where it’s
based, following a series of rating downgrades and financing
difficulties suffered by some of the city’s state-run firms. The
metropolis near Beijing also has the highest ratio of local government
financing vehicle bonds to GDP in China.
In short, if there a glitch with Tewoo's default, the Chinese dominoes could start really falling.
簡単に言うと、もしTewllが突然倒産となると、中国のドミノ倒しが本当に始まるかもしれない。
Since the first SOE bond default emerged in China’s domestic market
four years ago, 22 such firms have failed to make good on a combined
48.4 billion yuan ($6.9 billion) onshore bonds as of the end of October,
according to Guosheng Securities. However, as Bloomberg adds,
despite periodic scares such as late repayment, Chinese SOEs have yet
to suffer any high-profile default in the dollar bond market since the
collapse of Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corp. in 1998.
Tewoo would be precisely that high-profile default.
中国の国内債券市場での国有企業倒産が始まったのは数年前からのことで、それらの２２社の未払い最国内債券は１０月末で＄６．９Bにも達する、とGuosheng Securitiesは言う。しかしながら、ブルームバーグによると、利払い遅れを何度も起こしながらも、中国国有企業は１９９８年のGunadgong International Trust and Investment Corpの１９９８年倒産以来、ドル建て債権の大型倒産は起こしていなかった。Tewooはまさに大型倒産となりそうだ。
* * *
There were early signs of Tewoo Group’s debt crisis. The bankruptcy of Bohai Steel Group in
2018 triggered systemic risk in Tianjin’s financial market. The
incident involved a large number of local companies and financial
institutions, which recorded huge amounts of bad debt. Financial
institutions became more conservative in their lending standards, and
this resulted in liquidity issues for a number of Tianjin enterprises.
At the same time, Beijing’s deleveraging and capacity reduction
reforms made it difficult for a traditionally highly-leveraged company
like Tewoo to raise financing. The default in May 2018 by Hsin Chong
Group Holdings Limited, a company controlled by Tewoo, showed further
signs of financial problems at Tewoo Group.
While normally such a critical company as Tewoo would be quietly
bailed out by either Beijing or the local province, investors told
Bloomberg that the company's excessive debt levels will limit Tianjin
authorities’ ability to lend support to the city’s troubled firms,
prompting them to shun the latter’s debt. In July, Tianjin Binhai New
Area Construction & Investment Group postponed plans to sell a
three-year dollar bond offering amid such concern.
それと同時に、北京政府は債務削減を進めておりTewooのような伝統的多額債務企業の資金調達が難しくなった。２０１８年５月のHsin Chong Group Holdings Limited、Tewooの配下企業だが、の倒産では、Tewoo Groupno財政難兆候が見られた。Tewooのような重要企業の場合通常は静かに北京政府か地方政府の救済を受けるものだが、ブルームバーグの情報源によると、当社の債務額は天津省の貸し出し能力を超えるものだった。７月には、Tianjin Binhai New Area Consutruction Y Investment Groupはこういう懸念のなかで３年ものドル建て債権発行計画を延期した。
Tewoo’s debt issues that had surfaced from its current crisis may be
only the tip of the iceberg. Tianjin’s economic growth has slowed down
sharply since the beginning of 2016. GDP growth dropped to 1.9% in the
first quarter of 2018. Even as it started to rebound thereafter, the
outlook is still pessimistic, with GDP growth in 2018 less than 4%, which ranked last in the country according to iFast. Tewooの債務問題は氷山の一角に過ぎない。２０１６年始まりから、天津省経済は急速に鈍化している。２０１８Q1のGDP成長率は１．９％まで下落した。多少の反転はあったが、今後の見通しは悲観的なものだ、２０１８年のGDP成長は４％以下だった、中国のなかでは最低ランクだった、とiFastは伝える。
On the other hand, according to a 2016 report released by ratings agency Moody’s, state-owned
enterprises in Tianjin recorded an aggregate liability-to-fiscal
revenue ratio of more than 600%, which was the highest in the country.
At the same time, as shown in Tianjin municipal government’s most
recent three-year revenue and debt data, Tianjin government’s fiscal
revenue has declined significantly since 2017. Fiscal revenue fell by
close to RMB40 billion in 2017, while government borrowings rose
rapidly. By the end of 2018, debt owed by the Tianjin government was
almost double its fiscal revenue.
The bankruptcy of Bohai Steel, a Tianjin SOE, in 2018 may also be a
sign that the Tianjin government has lost control over the local debt
crisis. Other than Bohai Steel and Tewoo, there have been a number of
state-owned companies in Tianjin that are fighting to stave off
insolvencies, such as Tianjin Real Estate Group Co. Limited, which owes
RMB200 billion in debt. From the above observations, we think that in
the event of a default by Tewoo, the company is likely to go into
bankruptcy reorganization in a similar way as Bohai Steel, which has
brought in capital from the private sector for its corporate
restructuring. But for bondholders, recovery of their investments may be
difficult, and potential loss heavy.
２０１８年のが天津省所有のBohai Steel倒産が、天津省政府の地方債務コントロール能力喪失のサインだったのかもしれない。Bohai SteelやTewoo以外にも、債務未払い回避に努力する国有企業が天津省に何社かある、たとえばTianjin Real Estate Group Co. Limited
だ、債務額はRMB200B。こういう状況を鑑み、ZeroHedgeはこう考えている、Tewooの債務未払いで、当社はBohai Steelと同様に倒産とみなされそうだ、Bohai Steelの場合は企業再編で民間企業から資金を導入した。しかし債権保有者に対しては、投資資金の回収は難しいだろう、大きな損失となりうる。
So with Tianjin unlikely to step up, in the aftermath of Tewoo’s
proposed debt restructuring, which will indicate that Beijing will no
longer bail out even SOEs, investors’ skepticism about state support for
such state-linked firms will collapse, and a default could have wider
implications on how investors assess and price their bonds in the
future, said Judy Kwok-Cheung, director of fixed-income research at Bank
of Singapore.
"Investors would be going back to basics in assessing credit risk in
that the company’s stand-alone ability to repay is the first line of
defense when it comes to non-repayment risk," said Kwok-Cheung.
In short, "investors" would be reacquainted with a thing called "fundamentals." The horror, the horror. 簡単に言うと、「投資家」は「ファンダメンタルズ」という言葉を再認識するだろう。恐ろしや、恐ろしや。
* * *
It gets worse: should Tewoo's default spread to provincial-backed
debt, an already ugly situation could quickly turn catastrophic as
Tianjin has the highest debt burden among megacities and provinces in
China according to S&P. Earlier this year, Fitch cut ratings on
several government-related entities from the city, which is reliant on
heavy industry and commodities trading. As a result of having the
highest debt, Tianjin also has to slowest growth - Tianjin’s local
economy grew by 3.6% last year, the slowest in China; at the end of last
year, Tianjin’s government had 407.9 billion yuan worth of debt
outstanding, or about 22% of the size of its economy, said the Chinese
credit risk assessor.
And just in case the upcoming Tewoo D-Day isn't troubling enough, Moody's
said that it expected the number of Chinese defaults to continue to
rise in 2020 as economic growth sputters and the government attempts to
rein in support to indebted companies. Specifically, Moody's
expects 40-50 new defaults in 2020, up from 35 this year, according to
Ivan Chung, head of greater China credit research and analysis at
Moody’s.
“The regulators’ intention is to reduce moral hazard” while at the
same time ensuring any defaults “won’t undermine socioeconomic stability
or trigger systemic risks,” Chung said on Wednesday, who added that
whereas state support may be available for companies engaged in social
welfare projects, for those that are more commercial in nature,
"government support may not be so forthcoming," he said.
Which is the worst possible news for Tweoo's bondholders.
Tewoo's bondholders must quickly decide whether to accept the
exchange/tender proposal by December 9 and 10 respectively, with the
settlement date due on or around December 17. Since an event of default
is now assured, the next big question is what will bondholders of
China's other SOE's - those who bought bonds on the assumption that
China will always bail them out - do next? A flurry of aggressively
selling may be just the catalyst that cracks the market if it emerges in
the extremely illiquid days just before Christmas.
Mish: Gold Hits New Record High And There's More To Come by Tyler Durden Mon, 07/27/2020 - 10:10 Twitter Facebook Reddit Email Print Authored by Mike Shedlock via MishTalk, Gold futures just touched $1928 taking out the Intraday high of $1923.70 in 2011. ゴールド先物が＄１９２８になり、２０１１年の日中高値＄１９２３．７０を超えた。 11-Week Run １１週連続上昇 Gold is on a huge 11-week run. The last time gold did that was at the 2011 high. ゴールドはなんと１１週連続で上昇だ。前回の新高値は２０１１年のことだった。 Is a pullback in order? A Gold COT chart says otherwise. 通常の引き戻しが待ち構えているだろうか？ ゴールドのCoTチャートを見るとそうでもなさそうだ。 Gold COT Chart ゴールドCoTチャート Understanding Futures 先物市場を読み解く In the futures world there is a short for every long. 先物市場ではどのロングにもショートが対応している。 The first horizontal box has Large Specs, Small Specs, and Commercials. This is It's Old COT reporting. この図の下部、最初の横長い箱に示すのは Large Specs、Small Specs、そしてCommercialsのポジションだ。このチャートは従来からのCoT...
現在のCPI推移をみるとFEDの言う２％目標に収まりそうにはありません。実際現在の金利政策はまだ緩和的で、政府の大判振る舞いもあり、M2はコロナ騒動以前のトレンドを大きく超えたまま漸増し始めています。大統領選挙もあり、パウエルは今後利上げはないと言明しており、利下げ期待が高まっています。 In Gold We Trust 2024（２０ページ目）では１９７０年代のインフレ推移と現在２０２４年のインフレ推移を重ね、もっと大きなインフレがこれから来そうだと示唆しています。 https://ingoldwetrust.report/in-gold-we-trust-report/?lang=en 当時は数年間でゴールド価格は７倍になりました。直近のCPIのピーク値と比べると、今回は次のピーク、今後数年、でゴールドが５倍程度になることが期待されます。 ミシガン大学の調査ではインフレがFED目標の２％に落ち着くと期待されず、最近では期待値が増え始めています。
米国はよく理解してませんが、日本の場合では量的緩和で日銀が国債買い上げした資金は日銀当座預金にそのままです、市中には流れていません。でもNHKのニュース等では「ジャブジャブ」という表現をアナウンサーが使い、さらに丁寧に水道の蛇口からお金が吐き出される画像まで示してくれます。これって心理効果が大きいですよね。量的緩和とは何かを７時のニュースや新聞でこれ以上丁寧に解説するのはそう簡単ではありません。一般の人も株式をやっている人も「イメージ」で捉える以上はそう簡単にできません。多くの人は量的緩和とはなにか、を理解していないと私は想像しています。 ただし、国債を買い上げるので長期金利が低下し住宅ローン金利等が下がったのは確実な効果です。一方で長短金利差が少なくなると銀行のビジネスモデルが成り立たなくなりますが。 This Is The One Chart Every Trader Should Have "Taped To Their Screen" by Tyler Durden Sat, 01/19/2019 - 18:55 After a year of tapering, the Fed’s balance sheet finally captured the market’s attention during the last three months of 2018. 一年間のテーパリング後、FEDバランスシートがとうとう市場の注目をあびることになった、２０１８年の最後の３ヶ月だ。 By the start of the fourth quarter, the Fed had finished raising the caps on monthly roll-off of its balance sheet to the full $50bn per month (peaking at $30bn USTs, $20bn MBS...
