１２月のDデイに中国は身構える：巨大国有企業の「前代未聞」の倒産

China Braces For December D-Day: The "Unprecedented" Default Of A Massive State-Owned Enterprise

by Tyler Durden

Fri, 11/29/2019 - 16:20

Something is seriously starting to break in China's financial system.

中国金融システムに深刻な変調が起き始めている。

Three days after we described the self-destructive doom loop that is tearing apart China's smaller banks,  where a second bank run took place in just two weeks - an unprecedented event for a country where until earlier this year not a single bank was allowed to fail publicly and has now had no less than five bank  high profile nationalizations/bailouts/runs so far this year - the Chinese bond market is bracing itself for an unprecedented shock: a major, Fortune 500 Chinese commodity trader is poised to become the biggest and highest profile state-owned enterprise to default in the dollar bond market in over two decades.

中国の小規模銀行の「自滅ループ」に関する記事をZeroHedgeが公開してからわずか３日しかたたないが、ーーわずか２週で二回目の取り付け騒ぎがあったというものーー年初までは一行たりとも公式な倒産は許されなかったのだが、いまやすでに５行が国有化／救済／取り付けとなっているーー中国債券市場は前代未聞のショックに身構えている：フォーチュン５００に載るような大手コモディティ商社（国有企業）が２０年ぶりのドル建て債権デフォルトになりそうだ。


In what Bloomberg dubbed the latest sign that Beijing is more willing to allow failures in the politically sensitive SOE sector - either that, or China is simply no longer able to control the spillovers from its cracking $40 trillion financial system - commodity trader Tewoo Group  - the largest state-owned enterprise in China's Tianjin province - has offered an "unprecedented" debt restructuring plan that entails deep losses for investors or a swap for new bonds with significantly lower returns.

ブルームバーグが伝えるところでは、政治的に微妙な国有企業においても北京政府は倒産容認の模様だーーさらには、＄４０Tの金融システム瓦解がこぼれ出るのを単に中国政府が制御できないだけだーー、コモディティ商社 Tewoo Groupーー中国天津の最大の国有企業だーー当社が「前代未聞」の債務リストラ計画を申し出た、投資家に大きな損失をもたらすもので、極端にリターンの少ない新たな債権とスワップするというものだ。

Tewoo Group is a SOE conglomerate, owned by the local government and operates in a number of industries including infrastructure, logistics, mining, autos and ports, according to its website. It also operates in multiples countries including the U.S., Germany, Japan and Singapore. The company ranked 132 in 2018’s Fortune Global 500 list, higher than many other Chinese conglomerates including service carrier China Telecommunications and financial titan Citic Group. Even more notable are the company's financials: it had an annual revenue of $66.6 billion, profits of about $122 million, assets worth $38.3 billion, and more than 17,000 employees as of 2017, according to Fortune’s website.

Tewoo Gruopは国有コングロマリットだ、地方政府所有でインフラ建設・ロジスティック・鉱山・自動車・港湾と広範囲な事業を行っている。事業展開は多国籍に渡り、米国、ドイツ、日本そしてシンガポールで事業をおこなている。当社は２０１８年のフォーチュングローバル５００リストの１３２番目に格付けされた、他の多くの中国コングロマリットよりも上位だった、チャイナテレコムやCITICよりも上位だった。更に顕著なのは同社の財政だ：年間売上が＄６６．６B、利益が＄１２２M、資産価値は＄３８．３Bそして２０１７従業員は１７，０００人、とフォーチュンHPは伝える。

The state-owned company is neither publicly listed nor rated by the top three international ratings companies, although it does have publicly traded bonds whose performance in recent months has been nothing short of terrifying for anyone who thought purchasing a company explicitly backed by Beijing can never fail.

国有企業は上場もされないし格付会社の対象でもない、社債が公開されているが、ここ数か月で債券価格が恐ろしいことになった、公式に北京政府が支援している企業が倒産などするとは思わず債権は買われていたのだ。



As one can deduce from the above chart, the first time Tewoo Group’s financial difficulties emerged was in April when it sought debt extension from its lenders on its offshore, dollar bonds and sold copper below market rates amid a cash crunch. At that time, Fitch Ratings - the only rating agency to appraise the company's credit standing - slashed the company’s credit score first from BBB to BBB- on April 18, and then by a whopping six notches, from BBB - to B- on April 29, to reflect its weak liquidity and higher-than-expected leverage.

上のチャートを見ればだれでも解るが、最初にTewoo Groupの財政問題が顕在化したのは４月のことで、海外債権者へのドル建て債権が返済猶予となった、資金不足で銅を市場価格よりも安値で売却した。当時、フィッチ社がーー当社を観測している唯一の格付け会社だーー債券格付をBBBからBBB-にした、４月１８日のことだ、そして４月２９日にはなんと６段階格下げとしてBBB-からB-とした、弱い流動性とこれまで思っていた以上のレバレッジが明らかになったためだ。

According to Bloomberg the company has proposed an exchange/tender offer on the three dollar bonds due to mature over the next three years, as well as a perpetual note. What makes what would otherwise be a mundane exchange offer in the US, is that this is the first ever distressed plan of its kind from a state-owned Chinese firm.

ブルームバーグの報道によると、当社は今後３年で満期になるドル建て債権３本の交換を申し出た、永久債とするというものだ。米国ではよくあることだが、中国の国有企業がこういうふうになるのは初めてでよほどのことだ。

What is just as striking is that the Tewoo Group - with its $66 billion in revenues and $38 billion in assets - is likely to default on its $300 million dollar bond due Dec. 16, a Bloomberg source said, unless the exchange is consummated. This means that the company's bondholders have just a few weeks to decide between either taking as much as 64% in losses or accepting delayed repayment with sharply reduced coupons on $1.25 billion of dollar bonds, something which the rating agencies will describe as an event of default.

いまTewoo Groupが直面しているのはーー＄６６Bの売上で＄３８Bの資産を持つにも関わらずーー１２月１６日満期の＄３００M債権がデフォルトになりそうだということだ、とブルームバーグ情報源は言う、債権交換が実現しなかった場合だ。当社の債権保持者に残された時間はわずか３週間しか無い、６４％の損失を受け入れるか、ドル建て＄１．２５Bに大幅減額となったクーポンで返済遅れを受け入れるか、どちらかだ、格付会社はこの状況を倒産と認識するだろう。


A de facto default by Tewoo would be considered a “landmark case,” said Cindy Huang, an analyst at S&P Global Ratings. Central government support for SOEs is likely to be selective in the future, while local government aid will be limited by the slowing economy and weaker fiscal position, she said.

もはやTewooは倒産状態でこれは「中国のランドマーク現象だ」とCindy Huangは言う、彼女はS＆P Global Ratingsのアナリストだ。今後も中央政府が救済する国有企業は選択されるだろう、地方政府の救済力には限界がある、経済鈍化で財政難となっている、と彼女は言う。


The "distressed exchange offer" comes after Tewoo Group said last week it would be unable to pay interest on a $500 million bond, prompting Industrial & Commercial Bank of China to transfer $7.875 million to bondholders on its behalf. ICBC provided a standby letter of credit on the note - a pledge to repay if the borrower can’t. However, the firm’s remaining $1.6 billion of dollar bonds lack such protection.

先週のTewoo Groupの「絶望的な交換申し出」の後に＄５００M債権の利払いも出来ないだろう、債権保持者に＄７．８７５Bを送金するICBC中国工商銀行が督促している。ICBCは standby letter を提供しているーー債権者が返済できないときには代理返済を約束するというものだ。しかしながら、Tewoo Groupnihaには＄１．６Bのドル建て国債しか残っていない、返済には不足する。

Worse, Tewoo Group is already in effective default after some of its units previously missed local debt payments - in July, Tianjin Hopetone missed a coupon payment on its 1.21 billion yuan note sending the company's dollar bonds tumbling below 50 cents on the dollar, while Tianjin Haoying Industry & Trade missed a loan interest payment due in June. Also in July, rating agency Fitch - which somehow missed all of this when it was rating the company investment grade - withdrew its rating on Tewoo Group due to insufficient information to maintain the ratings. It last rated the issuer at B-.

悪いことに、Tewoo Groupはすでにその内部ユニットがすでに地方債務返済が出来ず実行的に倒産状態にあるーー７月に、Tianjin Hopetoneが１．２１B人民元のクーポン支払いが出来なかった、このためこの会社のドル建て債権が半額以下になった、一方で、Tianjin Haoying Industry &Tradeは６月の債権利払いが出来なかった、格付け会社Fitchによるとーこれを見て投資格付けを大幅に引き下げたーー格付けのための十分な資料をTewoo Groupが提供しないために格付けを断った。そのためB-が続いている。

And as furious bondholders scramble to demand an explanation how a state-owned enterprise can default, Beijing is already bracing for the inevitable next steps: earlier this month, Tianjin State-owned Capital Investment and Management, an entity wholly-owned by the Tianjin municipal government, was appointed to manage the company’s offshore debt. For now, the entity has no plan to hold controlling stakes in Tewoo Group, although that will likely change as soon as the company's financial situation fails to improve. Meanwhile, Tewoo Group said it plans to take a series of debt management measures, by which we assume it means it will restructure its debt.

そして怒り狂った債権保持者は問い詰めた、国有企業が倒産することなどあるのか説明しろと、北京政府はすでに回避不能な次の段階に身構えている：今月始めのことだ、Tianjin State-owned Capital Investment and Management、１００％天津省保有の組織だが、この組織が返済不能となった海外債務を処理するように指名した。今の所、この組織にTewoo Groupを指導する計画はまったくない、早急にTewoo Groupの財政問題改善が求めラルにも関わらずだ。それと同時に、Tewoo Groupが言うには、一連の債務問題への対処作を持っているという、それは債務再編であるとZeroHedgeは見ている。

The fact that a state owned enterprise such as Tewoo has just days before it defaults, in either a prepack or "freefall" form, suggests that Beijing will no longer bail out troubled SOEs, let alone private firms, perhaps due to the strains imposed by the economy which is slowing the most in three decades. It also raises concerns over Tianjin, where it’s based, following a series of rating downgrades and financing difficulties suffered by some of the city’s state-run firms. The metropolis near Beijing also has the highest ratio of local government financing vehicle bonds to GDP in China.

Tewooのような国有企業倒産まで残されたのは数日だ、何らかの救済か「自由落下」のどちらかだ、こうなると北京政府は問題を起こした国有企業を救済せずに民間格下げする、３０年ぶりの景気減速でこうせざるを得ないだろう。天津では懸念が高まっている、その他のいくつかの同省での国有企業では同様に一連の格下げと税制問題を抱えているからだ。北京近郊の大都市は地方政務債権の対GDP割合が極端に大きい。


In short, if there a glitch with Tewoo's default, the Chinese dominoes could start really falling.

簡単に言うと、もしTewllが突然倒産となると、中国のドミノ倒しが本当に始まるかもしれない。


Since the first SOE bond default emerged in China’s domestic market four years ago, 22 such firms have failed to make good on a combined 48.4 billion yuan ($6.9 billion) onshore bonds as of the end of October, according to Guosheng Securities. However, as Bloomberg adds, despite periodic scares such as late repayment, Chinese SOEs have yet to suffer any high-profile default in the dollar bond market since the collapse of Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corp. in 1998.
Tewoo would be precisely that high-profile default.

中国の国内債券市場での国有企業倒産が始まったのは数年前からのことで、それらの２２社の未払い最国内債券は１０月末で＄６．９Bにも達する、とGuosheng Securitiesは言う。しかしながら、ブルームバーグによると、利払い遅れを何度も起こしながらも、中国国有企業は１９９８年のGunadgong International Trust and Investment Corpの１９９８年倒産以来、ドル建て債権の大型倒産は起こしていなかった。Tewooはまさに大型倒産となりそうだ。

* * *
There were early signs of Tewoo Group’s debt crisis. The bankruptcy of Bohai Steel Group in 2018 triggered systemic risk in Tianjin’s financial market. The incident involved a large number of local companies and financial institutions, which recorded huge amounts of bad debt. Financial institutions became more conservative in their lending standards, and this resulted in liquidity issues for a number of Tianjin enterprises.

Tewoo Groupの債務危機の兆候はすでにあった。２０１８年にBohai Steel Group倒産をきっかけに天津省の金融市場でのシステミックリスクが生じた。この倒産で多くの地方企業や金融機関が巻き込まれた、これが巨額の不良債権を生み出した。金融機関は貸し出しにより慎重となり、天津省のいくつかの企業で流動性問題を引き起こした。




At the same time, Beijing’s deleveraging and capacity reduction reforms made it difficult for a traditionally highly-leveraged company like Tewoo to raise financing. The default in May 2018 by Hsin Chong Group Holdings Limited, a company controlled by Tewoo, showed further signs of financial problems at Tewoo Group.
While normally such a critical company as Tewoo would be quietly bailed out by either Beijing or the local province, investors told Bloomberg that the company's excessive debt levels will limit Tianjin authorities’ ability to lend support to the city’s troubled firms, prompting them to shun the latter’s debt. In July, Tianjin Binhai New Area Construction & Investment Group postponed plans to sell a three-year dollar bond offering amid such concern.

それと同時に、北京政府は債務削減を進めておりTewooのような伝統的多額債務企業の資金調達が難しくなった。２０１８年５月のHsin Chong Group Holdings Limited、Tewooの配下企業だが、の倒産では、Tewoo Groupno財政難兆候が見られた。Tewooのような重要企業の場合通常は静かに北京政府か地方政府の救済を受けるものだが、ブルームバーグの情報源によると、当社の債務額は天津省の貸し出し能力を超えるものだった。７月には、Tianjin Binhai New Area Consutruction Y Investment Groupはこういう懸念のなかで３年ものドル建て債権発行計画を延期した。

Tewoo’s debt issues that had surfaced from its current crisis may be only the tip of the iceberg. Tianjin’s economic growth has slowed down sharply since the beginning of 2016. GDP growth dropped to 1.9% in the first quarter of 2018. Even as it started to rebound thereafter, the outlook is still pessimistic, with GDP growth in 2018 less than 4%, which ranked last in the country according to iFast.

Tewooの債務問題は氷山の一角に過ぎない。２０１６年始まりから、天津省経済は急速に鈍化している。２０１８Q1のGDP成長率は１．９％まで下落した。多少の反転はあったが、今後の見通しは悲観的なものだ、２０１８年のGDP成長は４％以下だった、中国のなかでは最低ランクだった、とiFastは伝える。



On the other hand, according to a 2016 report released by ratings agency Moody’s, state-owned enterprises in Tianjin recorded an aggregate liability-to-fiscal revenue ratio of more than 600%, which was the highest in the country.
At the same time, as shown in Tianjin municipal government’s most recent three-year revenue and debt data, Tianjin government’s fiscal revenue has declined significantly since 2017. Fiscal revenue fell by close to RMB40 billion in 2017, while government borrowings rose rapidly. By the end of 2018, debt owed by the Tianjin government was almost double its fiscal revenue.

一方では、格付会社ムーディズの２０１６報告では、天津症の国有企業全体で、収入に対する債務比率は６００％を超える、これは中国国内で最高のものだ。それと同時に、天津省政府が最近開示した３年間の歳入と債務データによると、天津省の歳入は２０１７年以来大きく減少している。２０１７年には財政収入はRMB40Bまで下落した、一方で同省債務は急速に増えている。２０１８年末までに、天津省政府債務は歳入の倍になった。



The bankruptcy of Bohai Steel, a Tianjin SOE, in 2018 may also be a sign that the Tianjin government has lost control over the local debt crisis. Other than Bohai Steel and Tewoo, there have been a number of state-owned companies in Tianjin that are fighting to stave off insolvencies, such as Tianjin Real Estate Group Co. Limited, which owes RMB200 billion in debt. From the above observations, we think that in the event of a default by Tewoo, the company is likely to go into bankruptcy reorganization in a similar way as Bohai Steel, which has brought in capital from the private sector for its corporate restructuring. But for bondholders, recovery of their investments may be difficult, and potential loss heavy.

２０１８年のが天津省所有のBohai Steel倒産が、天津省政府の地方債務コントロール能力喪失のサインだったのかもしれない。Bohai SteelやTewoo以外にも、債務未払い回避に努力する国有企業が天津省に何社かある、たとえばTianjin Real Estate Group Co. Limited
だ、債務額はRMB200B。こういう状況を鑑み、ZeroHedgeはこう考えている、Tewooの債務未払いで、当社はBohai Steelと同様に倒産とみなされそうだ、Bohai Steelの場合は企業再編で民間企業から資金を導入した。しかし債権保有者に対しては、投資資金の回収は難しいだろう、大きな損失となりうる。

So with Tianjin unlikely to step up, in the aftermath of Tewoo’s proposed debt restructuring, which will indicate that Beijing will no longer bail out even SOEs, investors’ skepticism about state support for such state-linked firms will collapse, and a default could have wider implications on how investors assess and price their bonds in the future, said Judy Kwok-Cheung, director of fixed-income research at Bank of Singapore.

天津省のこれ以上の介入は難しく、Tewooの債務再編成提案に対して、北京政府は国有企業であったとしても救済しないだろう、投資家は国有企業も倒産するという疑いを持ち、倒産となると投資家の資産に大きな影響を与える、とJudy Kwok−Cheungは言う、彼女はシンガポール銀行の金利商品調査ディレクターだ。

"Investors would be going back to basics in assessing credit risk in that the company’s stand-alone ability to repay is the first line of defense when it comes to non-repayment risk," said Kwok-Cheung.

「投資家は与信リスクを評価するという原則に立ち戻るだろう、返済不能リスクに対処するとき企業自体に返済能力があるかどうかを見るのが第一歩だ。」とKwok-Cheungは言う。

In short, "investors" would be reacquainted with a thing called "fundamentals." The horror, the horror.

簡単に言うと、「投資家」は「ファンダメンタルズ」という言葉を再認識するだろう。恐ろしや、恐ろしや。

* * *
It gets worse: should Tewoo's default spread to provincial-backed debt, an already ugly situation could quickly turn catastrophic as Tianjin has the highest debt burden among megacities and provinces in China according to S&P. Earlier this year, Fitch cut ratings on several government-related entities from the city, which is reliant on heavy industry and commodities trading. As a result of having the highest debt, Tianjin also has to slowest growth - Tianjin’s local economy grew by 3.6% last year, the slowest in China; at the end of last year, Tianjin’s government had 407.9 billion yuan worth of debt outstanding, or about 22% of the size of its economy, said the Chinese credit risk assessor.

更に悪いことに：Tewooの倒産は天津省保証債務にも影響する、すでにひどい状況がすぐに壊滅的な状況になるだろう、中国大都市の中では天津省が債務負荷比率最高なのだ。今年はじめにFitchは同省での政府関連企業何社かを格下げした、重工業やコモディティ商社だ。高債務の結果、天津省自身が再鈍化成長となっているーー天津省の昨年経済成長率は３．６％だった、中国のなかでは最鈍足だ：昨年末時点で、天津省政府は４０７．９B人民元の債務を抱えていた、自省の経済規模の２２％にもなる、と中国与信評価専門家は言う。

And just in case the upcoming Tewoo D-Day isn't troubling enough, Moody's said that it expected the number of Chinese defaults to continue to rise in 2020 as economic growth sputters and the government attempts to rein in support to indebted companies. Specifically, Moody's expects 40-50 new defaults in 2020, up from 35 this year, according to Ivan Chung, head of greater China credit research and analysis at Moody’s.

これから来るTewooのDデイはそれほど大したことがない、ムーディズによると、２０２０年には中国の倒産は引き続き増えると見ている、経済成長が止まりかけていることに加え、政府は債務過多企業救済から手を引こうとしている。特に、ムーディーズによると、２０２０年に新たな倒産が４０−５０起きると見ている、今年は３５件だった、とIvan Chungは言う、彼はムーディーズの中国本土与信調査アナリスト主任だ。


“The regulators’ intention is to reduce moral hazard” while at the same time ensuring any defaults “won’t undermine socioeconomic stability or trigger systemic risks,” Chung said on Wednesday, who added that whereas state support may be available for companies engaged in social welfare projects, for those that are more commercial in nature, "government support may not be so forthcoming," he said.
Which is the worst possible news for Tweoo's bondholders.

「監督当局はモラルハザードを低減させようとしている」その一方でどの倒産に関しても「社会動乱やシステムリスクのきっかけとならないよう」にしている、とChungは水曜に語った、国は企業の社会保障プロジェクトをサポートする、社会保障が商業主義になっているが、「政府のサポートがそれほど有るとも思えない、」と彼は言う。Tweeoの債権保持者に取っては良くないニュースだ。

So what happens next?

では今後どうなるのだろう？

Tewoo's bondholders must quickly decide whether to accept the exchange/tender proposal by December 9 and 10 respectively, with the settlement date due on or around December 17. Since an event of default is now assured, the next big question is what will bondholders of China's other SOE's - those who bought bonds on the assumption that China will always bail them out - do next? A flurry of aggressively selling may be just the catalyst that cracks the market if it emerges in the extremely illiquid days just before Christmas.

Tewooの債権保持者はすぐに決断しなければならない、１２月９日もしくは１０日までに債権交換を受け入れるかどうかだ、債権の満期は１２月１７日前後だ。倒産確実となった今となっては、中国の他の国有企業債権を持っている人に何が訪れるかという大きな疑念が枠ーー中国政府が必ず救済すると信じて債権を買った人たちだーーどういう行動をとるだろう？積極的な狼狽売りとなると市場を壊してしまうきっかけになるかもしれない、もしそうなるとクリスマス前に極端な流動性困難な日を迎えることになる。