中国の銀行が、取り付け騒ぎの後に倒産の危機

Chinese Bank On Verge Of Collapse After Sudden Bank Run

by Tyler Durden

Thu, 10/31/2019 - 15:14

First it was Baoshang Bank , then it was Bank of Jinzhou, then, two months ago, China's Heng Feng Bank with 1.4 trillion yuan in assets, quietly failed and was just as quietly nationalized. Today, a fourth prominent Chinese bank was on the verge of collapse under the weight of its bad loans, only this time the failure was far less quiet, as depositors of the rural lender swarmed the bank's retail outlets, demanding their money in an angry demonstration of what Beijing is terrified of the most: a bank run.

最初はBaoshang Bankだった、次はBank of Jinzhou，そしてその二か月後１．４T人民元の資産規模となる中国のHeng Feng Bankが密かに倒産し密かに国有化された。今日、４番めの著名な中国銀行が倒産の極みにいる、多額の不良債権のためだ、今回の破綻はこれまでほど物静かではない、当地の預金者たちが窓口に殺到したのだ、北京政府が最も恐れていることで預金者が自らの預金を引き出そうと怒りのデモンストレーションをおこなった：取り付け騒ぎだ。


Local business leaders, political cadres and banking executives rallied Thursday at the main branch of Henan Yichuan Rural Commercial Bank, just outside the central Chinese city of Luoyang, where they stood one by one before a microphone to pledge their backing for the bank, as smiling employees brandished wads of cash before television cameras to demonstrate just how much cash, literally, the bank had.

当地のビジネスリーダー、地方政府幹部、そして銀行取締役が木曜にHenan Yichuan Rural Commercial Bankの最大支店に殺到した、洛陽市の郊外にある、次々とマイクロフォンで銀行の約束を求めた、銀行員はほほえみながらテレビカメラの前で新札の束を示し、銀行に十分な現金があることを示した。


It was China's latest, and most desperate attempt yet to project stability and reassure the public that all is well after rumors spread that the bank’s chairman was in trouble and the bank was on the brink of insolvency. However, as the WSJ reports, it wasn’t enough for 31-year-old Li Xue, who showed up for the third day Thursday to withdraw thousands of yuan of her mother’s life savings after hearing from fellow villagers that Yichuan Bank - which is the largest lender in Yichuan county by the number of branches and capital, and it is also a member of PBOC’s deposit insurance system, according to the local government - was going under.

これが直近の絶望的な試みだ、当行会長が問題を起こし銀行が支払不能だという噂が広まったことへの対応だ。しかしながら、WSJの報告によると、３１歳のLi Xueにとってはこれでは十分ではなかった、彼はYichuan Bankの噂を聞きつけ、母親の老後資金数千人民元を引き出そうとして水曜でもう３日になるというーーYichuan Bankは当地で最大の支店数と資産規模を誇る、そしてPBOCの預金保護システムの配下にある、と当地地方政府は言う、この銀行が行き詰まりつつある。

Customers form lines in front of Yichuan bank; photo: WSJ

Just like any self-respecting Ponzi scheme, the bank's branch managers tried to persuade her to keep her money with them until March, when her mother’s three-year deposits would mature, yielding more than 10,000 yuan in interest. And then, just like any Ponzi scheme, to sweeten the offer, the bank managers also offered her even higher-yielding products, plus supermarket gift cards, just to keep her money there..

どのPonzi schemeも主張することだが、当行の支店管理者たちは預金を３月まで口座に留め置くよう説得した、彼女の母の定期預金が満期になるまでだ、利息が１０，０００人民元以上になるためだ。そしてどのPonzi schmeも言うことだが、魅力的な提案をした、銀行管理者は更に金利の高い商品と、それに加えて商品券の提供を申し出た、彼女のお金を口座に留め置くためだ・・。

"Our bank is state-backed, and your money is insured by deposit insurance," one female manager told her, but Ms. Li refused, her confidence in the state's lies crushed.

「弊行は国家保証されている、あなたの預金は保護機構で守られている、」と一人の管理職が彼女に告げた、しかしMs. Liはそれを拒み、くにがかりの嘘への信頼は失墜した。

“We really can’t afford to lose the money,” she said.

「私達は本当にそのお金をなくすことはできないのです」と彼女は訴えた。


The bank run at Yichuan Bank, located in China's landlocked province of Henan, makes it at least the fourth bank that authorities have rushed to rescue this year. It won't be the last.

中国内陸河南省のYichuan Bankの取り付け騒ぎは、今年政府が救済する４番めの銀行となる。これが最後ではないだろう。

As we have documented previously, in recent month China’s banking sector has been dogged by a sudden surge in liquidity concerns, particularly among smaller regional banks that had expanded aggressively in recent years, and were now suffering a surge in bad loans, threatening their viability.

ZeroHedgeが以前記事にしたが、ここ数か月中国の銀行セクターは突然の流動性懸念に襲われてきた、とりわけここ数年積極的に拡大してきた地方の小規模銀行で顕著だ、今やそのような銀行が不良債権で悩まされている、銀行存続が危ぶまれているのだ。

In May, regulators bailed out Baoshang Bank, in the country’s first bank bailout since the 1990s. That move led to widespread concerns about the health of other small lenders and financial institutions, squeezing liquidity in China’s interbank market. It also led to similar failures - and rescues - of Bank of Jinzhou and Heng Feng Bank, both smallish regional banks, yet big enough to convince the local population that something was very rotten with China's financial system.

５月には、監督当局がBaoshang Bank を救済した、１９９０年以来初めてとなる銀行救済だった。この出来事で他の小規模銀行、金融機関の健全性に懸念が持たれるようになり、中国のインターバンク市場の流動性を押し込めた。同様の破綻と救済が行われた、Bank of Jinzhou とHeng Feng Bankだ、どちらも小規模地方銀行だが、当地の人にとって中国の金融システムが腐っていることを確信させるには十分だった。


Prudently, Beijing has been careful not to announce any takeovers, although it has quietly brought in state-owned banks and asset management firms, as well as an arm of the nation’s sovereign-wealth fund, to inject fresh capital and stabilize wobbly banks, as it did most recently in the case of Heng Feng.

慎重にも、北京政府はどの国有化も広報していない、密かに国有銀行が問題銀行や問題金融機関を買収した、政府系ファンドも利用した、新たに資金を注入し不安定な銀行を安定化した、直近の例がHeng Feng銀行だ。


Try as Beijing might, however, the bailouts have not gone unnoticed, and culminated in what today has been a three-day bank run at Yichuan Bank.
Like with everything else in China, there is good and bad news.

北京政府は救済が表面化しないように試みたが、今回はYichuan Bankは３日間の取り付け騒ぎで最高潮に達した。中国ではいつものことだが、良いニュースと悪いニュースがある。
　

The good news is that troubled banks accounted for just 4% of total assets in China’s banking system, according to a recent estimate by S&P Global that included poor quality rural institutions flagged by the Chinese central bank. An analysis by Barclays listed those banks that had delayed to disclose their 2018 annual reports: a clear indicator of imminent collapse. Three of the top four banks have already been nationalized or bailed out.

良いニュースとしては、問題を引き起こした銀行の全資産は中国の銀行システムの全資産の４％に過ぎない、とS&P Globalは見積もっている、中国中央銀行が問題銀行と指摘するものでだ。バークレイのアナリストによるとそれらの銀行は２０１８決算開示が遅れている：明らかに倒産が差し迫っている。問題銀行上位４行のうち３行はすでに国有化もしくは救済された。

However, in this case size really does not matter, and the aggressive response from regulators to the developments at Yichuan Bank, a small lender with just 62.65 billion yuan ($8.9 billion) in assets, underscores the heightened concerns of contagion and social instability amid the loss of confidence in bank deposits, as the WSJ notes.

しかしながら、ここでは銀行の規模は問題ではない、Yichuan Bankの成り行きに監督当局は積極的に体操しており、わずか＄８．９Bの資産規模の小銀行にも積極対応している、これが連鎖して社会不安を引き起こすことをとても懸念している、銀行預金に対する信頼性をだ、とWSJは伝える。


The bad news is that small banks are just the start of a wave that could eventually topple some of China's biggest SOEs. Yichuan Bank is emblematic of the thousands of banks and cooperatives in China’s countryside that in recent years had scaled up its ambitions. In 2009, the rural cooperative became a commercial lender, attracting deposits primarily from farmers and county locals, according to the bank. It then kept growing at a tremendous pace, raking up billions in bad loans, until one day - like all Ponzi schemes - the new money stopped trickling in and the bank's day of reckoning had arrived.

悪いニュースは、小銀行の問題は単なる始まりでやがては中国の最大手国有企業に問題を引き起こすのではないかということだ。Yichuan Bankは中国に数千とある地方銀行・企業を象徴している、どの銀行・企業もここ数年過大な野心のもとに拡大を続けてきた。２００９年に地方企業は商業銀行を設立した、農家から預金を集めたのだ。そして驚くほどの速度で規模を拡大し、巨額の不良債権を抱えた、どのPonzi schmesもそうだが、どこかの時点で新規資金流入が止まる、こうなると銀行は「最後の審判の日」を迎えるのだ。


While Yichuan Bank has plenty of competition, including large state-owned banks in nearby Luoyang, an ancient capital of China known, Yichuan Bank accounted for 71% of deposits and 82% of loans in its county as of September 2018, according to China Chengxin International Rating Agency.

Yichuan Bankにも多くの競合企業がある、その中には大規模国有銀行もある、洛陽市の近くにだ、中国では著名な古い首都だ、2018年９月時点でYichauna Bankは当地の預金の７１％、貸し出しの８２％を占めていた、とChina Chengxin Internationa Rating Agencyのデータが示す。


The problem, as hinted above, is that like most other small Chinese banks, Yichuan Bank suffered from a buildup of bad loans as the economy slowed in recent years, and struggled to retain deposits amid intensified competition from its peers.
That was the proverbial Minsky moment when every Ponzi scheme ends.

これまでの議論の中にヒントはあるが、問題は他の小規模銀行同様に、Yichuan Bankもここ数年の経済減速の中で不良債権を積み上げてきた、そして競合銀行がある中で預金獲得で苦しんできた。これはどのPonzi schmeも最終的に行きつくミンスキーモメントだ。


Then the warnings came: in July, analysts at China Chengxin flagged the bank for its lack of stable deposits and a rapid buildup of overdue and bad loans. Bad loans ballooned to 1 billion yuan at the end of 2018, a 10-fold increase in just three years, according to its financial statements. Overdue loans, meantime, grew to 28% of its total credit at the end of September 2018, the credit rating agency said.

こうして警告が発せられる：６月に中国新華社のアナリストが銀行リストを示した、定常的に預金獲得ができず不良債権を急速に増やしている銀行だ。２０１８年末には不良債権は１B人民元まで膨れ上がった、わずか３年で１０倍増だ、と同社の金融報告書は告げる。２０１８年９月末には、返済延期ローンが全貸し出しの２８％にもなった、と格付会社は言う。


That number, incidentally, is orders of magnitude higher than what the PBOC discloses as China's average bad loan percentage, which in the past decade has stubbornly, and erroneously, been stuck in the mid-1% range. The true number is far, far higher, but Beijing guards it with its life, as the alternative is a bank run on the world's largest bank system, which with $40 trillion in assets, is roughly double that of the US.

ちなみに、この数字はPBOCが中国の平均不良債権割合として開示した数値よりも桁違いに大きい。PBOCの開示数値はこの１０年変わっていない、とても信じられないが１％代半ばだと言い続けてきた。本当の数値はこれよりも遥かに大きなものだ、しかし北京政府は断固としてこの数値を主張する、さもなくばこの世界最大の銀行システムで取り付け騒ぎとなる、その資産規模は＄４０Tもあり米国の倍にもなるのだ。
　

So far Beijing has been lucky, in that people tend to be notoriously bad with numbers. Ironically, what brought the bank down was news of trouble with Yichuan’s senior management that initially caught locals’ attention. Immediately thereafter, depositors started demanding their money back earlier this month; as speculation circulated on social media that the bank was on the verge of insolvency, the crowds at bank branches grew thicker, and so the bank run began.

北京政府は幸運なことに、これまで人々は数値に疎かった。皮肉なことに、当行悪化を知らしめたのは、Yichauanの上級管理職のせいだ、彼がこの地域で耳目を集めた。その直後の今月始めに、預金者が預金引き出しを求め始めた；当行が支払不能の瀬戸際にあるというソーシャルメディアでの噂が広まったためだ、銀行支店に人が押し寄せ、取り付け騒ぎが始まった。
By Wednesday, the problem - and its media coverage - was too big to avoid, and local authorities moved swiftly to stabilize the situation. In typical Chinese fashion, however, instead of fixing the underlying problem, they blamed the messenger and announced they had detained two women whom they accused of spreading false rumors; they also brought in the county’s deputy party secretary to take charge.
And since explaining to the people that China's entire financial system is one giant house of cards, the authorities needed a scapegoat. They got it when they announced an investigation into the bank’s former chairman, citing a violation of discipline, a charge commonly used in corruption cases.

水曜までには、問題が大きくなりすぎメディアも無視できなくなり、地方政府が状況を安定化するように迅速に行動した。しかしながら、中国のいつものやり方通り、問題の本質を解決するのではない、噂を広めた二人の女性の責任を問うた、偽情報流布の罪で逮捕した；彼らはまた当地の共産党副代表の責任を問うた。中国の金融システム全体が一つの巨大なハウス・オブ・カードであるために、当局はスケープゴートを必要とした。当局は当行の前会長を捜査すると宣言してスケープゴートとした、規律違反の罪だ、腐敗追放でいつも使われる手法だ。


Meanwhile, having received a few truckloads full of cash, county authorities tried to ease depositor panic saying they had tens of billions of yuan in funds available, which the bank had already begun tapping, according to the bank.

それと同時に現金満載の何台かのトラックが到来し、現金はいくらでもあると見せることで当局は預金者の混乱をなだめようとした、銀行はすでに手を打っていた。


So far this approach has failed to restore confidence, and bank officers, overwhelmed with withdrawal requests, put stacks of cash on display behind bank windows. They dangled various inducements, "including boxes of tissue, plastic chairs, tea thermoses and loose leaf tea" according to the WSJ, to persuade customers to keep their deposits with Yichuan.

ただし、この手法で信頼回復を得ることはできなかった、銀行員は預金引き出しの多さに困り果てて、現金の山を銀行の窓にディスプレイした。彼らは各種のおまけも差し出した、「ティッシュ箱、プラスチックの椅子、魔法瓶とかお茶の葉」とWSJは伝える、顧客に預金をYichuanの口座に留め置くよう説得するためだ。


And why not: cheap bribes almost worked in Spain in 2012, when the then-insolvent Bankia handed out Spiderman towels in exchange for a €300 deposit.
Surprisingly, it did not work in China, as people continued to show up, adamant about withdrawing their funds; the bank run was accelerating, and nothing officials did could halt, or reverse it.

どうしてそんなことをするかというと：２０１２年のスペインの取り付け騒ぎでは安物のおまけがうまく機能した、そのとき支払不能となったBankiaは€３００預金と引き変えにスパイダーマンタオルを渡し、ことを収めた。驚くことに、中国ではうまくゆかなかった、次々と預金者が殺到し、断固として引き出しを求めた；取り付け騒ぎは拡大し、騒ぎを収めることはできなかった。


Zhang Yanting, a 51-year-old farmer, decided after several days of trying to pull his money out of the bank that he would keep his account open to collect the few dollars in grain subsidies he receives each year from the government. But Zhang still wanted most of his 13,000 yuan in deposits back.

Zhang Yanting,５１歳農家、は数日間預金を引き出そうとしたが、その後政府からの援助金を受け取るために口座をそのままにした。しかしZhangはそれでもみずからの１３，０００人民元の預金の払い出しを望んでいる。


After hours in line Thursday, the bank cashier handed him a wad of cash, which he happily stuffed into his bag. Zhang was unmoved by the promise of gifts, save for a bottle of water that he sipped from while waiting.

木曜に数時間並んだ後、銀行窓口担当者は彼に現金を手渡した、彼は幸運にもその現金をかばんに詰めた。Zhanは約束されたおまけを受け取るまで動かなかった、待っている間に飲んだミネラルウオーターの元をとろうとした。


“I’ve been with the bank for 10 years and have never seen service this good,” he said.

「私はこの銀行ともう１０年も付き合っている、でも一度もこういうおまけをもらったことがない、」と彼は言う。

Zhang Yanting, a 51-year-old farmer, walked away with a wad of cash from his savings account at Yichuan Bank

Zhang was a happy customer: he learned that when dealing with a collapsing Ponzi scheme, only those who pull their money first stand to recover anything. It's those who foolishly believed the government's propaganda that all is well, who will be far, far angrier when they realize that it's gone... it's all gone.

Zhangは幸運な顧客だった；彼は学んだのだ、崩壊するPonzi schmeに対応するには、なにはともあれ自らの預金を引き出すことが大切だと。全ては順調だという政府のプロパガンダを信じる人は、全てを失ってしまってから遥かに大きな怒りを持つだろう・・・・すべてを失ってからね。