Back
in the days of the Fed's QE, much of thinking analyst world (the
non-thinking segment would merely accept everything that the Fed did
without question, after all their livelihood depended on it), was
focused on how massive, and shocking, the Fed's direct intervention in
capital markets had become. And while that was certainly true, what we
showed back in November 2013 in "Chart Of The Day: How China's Stunning $15 Trillion In New Liquidity Blew Bernanke's QE Out Of The Water"
is that whereas the Fed had injected some $2.5 trillion in liquidity in
the US banking system, China had blown the US central bank out of the
water, with no less than $15 trillion in increases to Chinese bank
assets, all at the behest of a juggernaut of new credit creation - be it
new yuan loans, shadow debt, corporate bonds, or any other form of debt
that makes up China's broad Total Social Financing aggregate.
FEDがQEを行っていた頃、思慮深いアナリストは(何も考えない人たちは疑問を持つことなくFEDのすることをすべて受け入れていた、結局彼らの生計はFEDに依存しているにすぎない)、それが如何に大きいか、またショッキングな出来事であるかに注目していた、FEDが直接資本市場に介入してきたわけなので。そしてそれはたしかに本当だったが、ZeroHedgeは2013年11月にこういう記事を示した「Chart of the Day: 中国はなんと$15Tの新規流動性を投入しBernankeのQEを打ちのめした」、FEDの流動性注入はわずか$2.5Tだったが、中国は米国中央銀行を打ちのめして、なんと$15Tもの流動性注入を行っった、圧倒的な新規与信生成によるものだったーー新たな人民元貸付、シャードー債務、企業債権、そのたあらゆる方法を駆使して中国の幅広い「社会融資総量 Total Social Financing」を積み上げた。
Now, almost six years later, others are starting to figure out what
we meant, and in an Op-Ed in the FT, Arthur Budaghyan, chief EM
strategist at BCA Research writes about this all important topic of
China's "helicopter" money - which far more than the Fed, ECB and BOJ -
has kept the world from sliding into a depression, and yet is blowing
the world's biggest asset bubble.
Budaghyan picks up where we left off, and notes that over the past decade, Chinese
banks have been on a credit and money creation binge, and have created
RMB144Tn ($21Tn) of new money since 2009, more than twice the amount of
money supply created in the US, the eurozone and Japan combined over the
same period. In total, China’s money supply stands at Rmb192tn, equivalent to $28 TRILLION.
Why does this matter? Because Chine money's supply is the size of broad
money supply in the US and the eurozone put together, yet China’s
nominal GDP is only two-thirds that of the US.
This, as the BCA analyst explains, is a major problem.
BCAアナリストの解説では、これが大きな問題だ。
Below we repost his latest FT Op-Ed, which explains why - as we said
in the 2019 year ahead post - we remain confident that the spark for
the next global financial crisis will be in China.
* * * China’s ‘helicopter money’ is blowing up a bubble, authored by Arthur Budaghyan is chief emerging market strategist at BCA Research, and first published in the FT. 中国の「ヘリコプターマネー」がバブルを膨らませている、著者 Arthur Budaghyan BCAリサーチ主任新興市場ストラテジスト、FTでの最初の記事。
The escalation of the trade conflict between the US and China has
raised the likelihood of greater stimulus by Beijing to prop up the
economy. While China’s excessive debt isn’t news, investors must wake up to the reality of “helicopter money” — enormous money creation by Chinese banks “out of thin air”.
While this sugar rush may provide short and medium-term cover for
investors, the long-term effects will exacerbate China’s credit bubble.
China, like any nation, faces constraints on frequent and large
stimulus, and its vast and still rapidly expanding money supply will
produce growing devaluation pressures on the renminbi.
When a bubble emerges we are often told that this bubble is
different. Many economists justify China’s credit and money bubble and
continuing stimulus by pointing to the nation’s high savings rate. But
this narrative is false. At its root is the idea that banks are
channelling or intermediating deposits into loans. This is not how banks
operate.
When a bank expands its balance sheet, it simultaneously creates an
asset (say, a loan) and a liability (a deposit, or money supply). No one
needs to save for this loan and money to be originated. The bank does not transfer someone else’s deposits to the borrower; it creates a new deposit when it lends.
In all economies, neither the amount of deposits nor the money supply
hinge on national or household savings. When households and companies
save, they do not alter the money supply.
Banks also create deposits/money out of thin air when they buy securities from non-banks. As banks in China buy more than 80 per cent of government bonds, fiscal stimulus also leads to substantial money creation. In short, when banks engage in too much credit origination — as they have done in China — they generate a money bubble.
Over the past 10 years, Chinese banks have been on a credit
and money creation binge. They have created Rmb144tn ($21tn) of new
money since 2009, more than twice the amount of money supply created in
the US, the eurozone and Japan combined over the same period. In total, China’s money supply stands at Rmb192tn, equivalent to $28tn. It
equals the size of broad money supply in the US and the eurozone put
together, yet China’s nominal GDP is only two-thirds that of the US.
In a market-based economy constraints are in place, such as the
scrutiny of bank shareholders and regulators, which prevent this sort of
excess. In a socialist system, such constraints do not exist.
Apparently, the Chinese banking system still operates in the latter.
There are clear downsides. Helicopter money discourages innovation
and breeds capital misallocation, which reduces productivity growth.
Slowing productivity and strong money growth ultimately lead to rising
inflation — the dynamics inherent to socialist systems.
Air show in Tianjin, China shows off China's helicopters. Getty Images.
In the long run, more stimulus in China will entail more money
creation and will heighten devaluation pressures on the renminbi. As we
all know, when the supply of something surges, its price typically
drops. In this case, the drop will take the form of currency
devaluation.
As it stands, China’s money bubble is like a sword of Damocles over the nation’s exchange rate.
Chinese households and businesses have become reluctant to hold this
ballooning amount of local currency. Continuous helicopter money will
increase their desire to diversify their renminbi deposits into foreign
currencies and assets. Yet, there is no sufficient supply of
foreign currency to accommodate this conversion. China’s current account
surplus has almost vanished.
As to the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves, at $3tn
they are less than a ninth of the amount of renminbi deposits and cash
in circulation. It is inconceivable that China can open its capital
account in the foreseeable future.
If China chooses the path of unrelenting stimulus, investors should
recognise the long-term negative outlook for the renminbi. Continuous
stimulus will beef up investment returns in local currency terms, but
currency depreciation will substantially erode returns in US dollars or
euros in the long run.
The investment implications go beyond Chinese markets. Market
volatility over the past few months as the talk of stimulus picked up
has given us a peek into the future. As the renminbi has
depreciated by 12 per cent since early 2018, the pain has reverberated
across Asian and other emerging markets. The MSCI Asia and MSCI
EM equities indices have each fallen 24 per cent in dollar terms since
their peak in January 2018. Long-term pressures could play out even more
dramatically.
Fortunately, Chinese authorities recognise these issues. Yet they
face an immense task of stabilising growth while containing credit and
money expansion. This will be hard to achieve in an economy that has
become addicted to credit creation.
The Next Decade Will Likely Foil Most Financial Plans by Tyler Durden Tuesday, Jan 26, 2021 - 15:20 Authored by Lance Roberts via RealInvestmentAdvice.com, There are many individuals in the market today who have never been through an actual “bear market.” These events, while painful, are necessary to “reset the table” for outsized market returns in the future. Without such an event, it is highly likely the next decade will foil most financial plans. 現在の市場参加者の多くは本当の「ベアマーケット」を経験していない。こういう事が起きると、痛みを伴うが、将来の大きなリターンを可能にするために必要なちゃぶ台返しとなる。これがないと、多くのファイナンシャルプランは今後10年ひどいことになりそうだ。 No. The March 2020 correction was not a bear market. As noted: 2020年3月の調整はベアマーケットと呼べるようなものではなかった。以前にも指摘したが: A bull market is when the price of the market is trending higher over a long-term period. ブル相場とは長期に渡り市場価格が上昇するものだ。 A bear market is when the previous advance breaks, and prices begin to trend lower. ベア相場とはこれまでの上昇が止まり、市場価格が下落し始めることだ。 The chart belo...
The Fed And The Treasury Have Now Merged by Tyler Durden Thu, 04/09/2020 - 14:21 Submitted by Jim Bianco of Bianco Research As I've argued, the Fed and the Treasury merged. Powell said this was the case today (from his Q&A): 私はこれまでも申し上げてきたが、すでにFEDと財務省は一体化している。Powell自身がこれに当たると今日話した(彼の Q&Aでのことだ): These programs we are using, under the laws, we do these, as I mentioned in my remarks, with the consent of the Treasury Secretary and the fiscal backing from the congress through the Treasury. And we are doing it to provide credit to households, businesses, state and local governments. As we are directed by the Congress. We are using that fiscal backstop to absorb any losses we have. 我々FEDが今行っている一連のプログラムは、法に基づいており、それを実行している、私が注意喚起したが、 財務長官の同意を得ており、財政に関しては議会の承認も得ている。私どもは家計、ビジネス、連邦地方政府に貸付を行っている。議会の意向のもとに我々は行動している。以下ほどに損失が生じようともそれを財政的に支えている。 Our ability is limited...