Authored by Alasdair Macleod via GoldMoney.com,
We are all used to the bullion banks covering their shorts on Comex
by waiting until the speculators are over-bullish and vulnerable to
mark-downs that trigger their stops. Algorithmic traders go from long to
short in a heartbeat as well, and they dump contracts into a falling
market, speeding up the decline. We should say at this juncture that the
Managed Money speculators are short-term, attracted by futures
leverage, and their gold position is often part of a wider risk strategy
deployed by hedge funds. They do not intend to stand for delivery. The
wider investment world taking strategic portfolio decisions does not
often get involved with gold, so the Comex gold contract has been a
secular play.
The table below shows a typical set-up, in this case July 2016. The
Managed Money category (296,106 — net 259,129 contracts) is close to
record long. Open interest was 633,000 contracts and the gold price was
at $1360, having run up from $1040 the previous December.
In the non-speculative category, the bullion banks (Swaps) had 56% of
the shorts and the Producer/Merchants 44%. Mark-to-market value of the
Swaps net short position was $25bn. Of the speculative longs, the
managed money category (hedge funds) held 69%, and at 296,106 long
contracts it was almost a record. There was a high level of bullishness;
easy pickings for the bullion banks, who by the following December
drove the price down to $1120, reducing their net shorts to under 50,000
contracts.
It was a game that evolved out of Comex futures being used simply to
offset long bullion positions at the LBMA. Over time, bullion bank
traders increased their trading position limits, as opposed to their
pure hedging activity, making easy money jobbing the other side of
Managed Money trades.
Now look at the current situation, with the gold price at decade highs ($1775) and open interest at 561,628 (30 June).
では、現在の状況を見てみよう、ゴールド価格は十年ぶりの高値($1775)になり、open interestは6月30日時点で561,628枚だ。
In the non-speculator category, the Swaps are more short than they
were in July 2016 despite open interest being 71,372 contracts lower.
The mark-to-market value is record net short at $36.6 billion. What has
happened is the Producer/Merchants have cut their positions, presumably
deciding that hedging mine output is less important in the current
inflationary environment. Consequently, the bullion banks are bearing
71% of the short exposure.
The speculator category makes this more interesting still. At 138,555
net long, hedge funds are only 25,000 contracts longer than average,
and compared with their bullishness in July 2016 have hardly got going.
It is the other categories, Other Reported and Non-reported have taken
56% of the long side, and they are not behaving like skittish hedge
funds at all. These include family offices, the ultra-wealthy and
foreigners through Globex who are standing for delivery as a means of
getting their hands on physical bullion —171 tonnes from the June
contract alone.
Bullion banks are between a rock and a hard place. For years they’ve
been playing the hedge funds as an angler hooks and plays a fish. That
game has ceased and there is no easy way for them to get level. For the
moment they are trying to put a lid on the price, but the cost has been
rising open interest, and therefore rising mark-to-market positions.
The August active contract runs off the board at the end of this
month and bullion banks are likely to be forced into large delivery
volumes again. Furthermore, the exchange for delivery arbitrage facility
between Comex and the LBMA is broken, allowing Comex premiums to London
spot to go unchallenged.
It is increasingly possible the gold contract is evolving into deep crisis, and that force majeure might have to be declared if, as seems increasingly inevitable, a wider banking crisis ensues.
The Next Decade Will Likely Foil Most Financial Plans by Tyler Durden Tuesday, Jan 26, 2021 - 15:20 Authored by Lance Roberts via RealInvestmentAdvice.com, There are many individuals in the market today who have never been through an actual “bear market.” These events, while painful, are necessary to “reset the table” for outsized market returns in the future. Without such an event, it is highly likely the next decade will foil most financial plans. 現在の市場参加者の多くは本当の「ベアマーケット」を経験していない。こういう事が起きると、痛みを伴うが、将来の大きなリターンを可能にするために必要なちゃぶ台返しとなる。これがないと、多くのファイナンシャルプランは今後10年ひどいことになりそうだ。 No. The March 2020 correction was not a bear market. As noted: 2020年3月の調整はベアマーケットと呼べるようなものではなかった。以前にも指摘したが: A bull market is when the price of the market is trending higher over a long-term period. ブル相場とは長期に渡り市場価格が上昇するものだ。 A bear market is when the previous advance breaks, and prices begin to trend lower. ベア相場とはこれまでの上昇が止まり、市場価格が下落し始めることだ。 The chart belo...
The Fed And The Treasury Have Now Merged by Tyler Durden Thu, 04/09/2020 - 14:21 Submitted by Jim Bianco of Bianco Research As I've argued, the Fed and the Treasury merged. Powell said this was the case today (from his Q&A): 私はこれまでも申し上げてきたが、すでにFEDと財務省は一体化している。Powell自身がこれに当たると今日話した(彼の Q&Aでのことだ): These programs we are using, under the laws, we do these, as I mentioned in my remarks, with the consent of the Treasury Secretary and the fiscal backing from the congress through the Treasury. And we are doing it to provide credit to households, businesses, state and local governments. As we are directed by the Congress. We are using that fiscal backstop to absorb any losses we have. 我々FEDが今行っている一連のプログラムは、法に基づいており、それを実行している、私が注意喚起したが、 財務長官の同意を得ており、財政に関しては議会の承認も得ている。私どもは家計、ビジネス、連邦地方政府に貸付を行っている。議会の意向のもとに我々は行動している。以下ほどに損失が生じようともそれを財政的に支えている。 Our ability is limited...